Hafez Bashar al-Assad, the eldest son of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, is named in the latest list of 14 senior Syrian regime officials and entities sanctioned by the US State Department under the so-called Caesar Act.

The designations, focusing on the “barbarous First Division of the Syrian Army”, are the second wave of sanctions to be applied under the act following the first move by the US State Department on 17 June.

The first wave attacked the businessmen that have bankrolled Assad, with secondary sanctions designed to discourage any other external actor having any dealings with the Assad business circle.

No sanctions were imposed on Russia or Assad supporters in the Middle East outside Syria, but the US urged everyone to wind down all connections with the Syrian regime.

The US deputy assistant secretary of state, Joel Rayburn, said the sanctions were timed to be introduced in the week of some of the worst atrocities committed by the Assad regime in 2011 and 2019.

Asked why Assad’s teenage son had been added to the list – he was born in 2001 – Rayburn said: “There has been a trend of senior Syrian regime actors and business people who have been active in the regime to do business through their adult family members to evade sanctions.

“It seems very clear that the immediate family of Bashar al-Assad and their in-laws are attempting to consolidate economic power inside Syria so that they could use this to further consolidate political power.”

He said: “Assad would only use such power to strengthen the killing machine against the Syrian people”. He denied that the sanctions would have any impact on humanitarian trade or on the economy of Lebanon.

The steady drumbeat of sanctions, mimicking a US policy long adopted elsewhere in the Middle East notably Iran, reveals a determination in Washington to use non-military leverage to force the Assad regime to negotiate the terms of a political settlement with the largely routed opposition.

Syria is stuck in a stalemate with Assad’s Iranian and Russian backers unable to destroy the last opposition stronghold in Idlib, but Assad himself is adamant that he will not cooperate with the UN-led peace process, including on a new constitution for the country.

The UN security council has most recently deadlocked about the number of humanitarian cross border crossings into Syria with Russia and China insisting that only one could be allowed. The deadlock came as coronavirus started to creep into refugee camps in and around Syria.

The Caesar sanctions, passed into law in December 2019, are named in memory of the Syrian code named Caesar that smuggled photos out of Syria showing the scale of atrocities in Assad’s prisons.

Rayburn vowed “this is a campaign that will continue. This is going to be the summer of Caesar.”

He insisted the sanctions were having a chilling effect on expected external investment into Syria.

Below is a full rush transcript of the Briefing with Joel D. Rayburn, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Envoy for Syria, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

DAS Rayburn: I appreciate everyone being with us today. Just a few minutes ago, Secretary Michael Pompeo released a statement announcing that today the State Department and the Treasury Department are continuing the United States sanctions campaign against the Assad regime by releasing 14 new designations under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act and other authorities. This is a campaign that began last month with the first round of Caesar Act designations on June 17th. I want to highlight that today, within the United States Government, we have named today’s tranche of designations the Hama and Maarat Al-Numan sanctions, and these names are meant to memorialize the victims of two of the Assad regime’s most notorious atrocities, both of which occurred in this week in 2011 and 2019, respectively.

Nine years ago, Bashar al-Assad’s troops carried out a brutal siege of the city of Hama, killing scores of peaceful protesters in a shocking sign of what was to come. And this week one year ago, the Assad regime and its allies bombed a busy marketplace in Maarat Al-Numan, killing 42 innocent Syrians.

The Department of State and the Department of Treasury together are committed to increasing the economic and financial pressure on the Assad regime, and one of the ways we are doing this is through our various sanctions regimes, to include the Syria – the Caesar Act, which was signed into law by the President in December 2019. As you have seen by our announcement on June 17th and this morning, we have now designated since June 17th more than 50 of Bashar al-Assad’s key supporters and their businesses, as well as some key military units that act either in or on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Regardless of whether these actors are designated pursuant to the Caesar Act itself or under other executive orders, we view them all as in-line – all these designations, I should say as in-line with the goals of the Caesar Act given that the legislation imposes sanctions on anyone who engages in significant business with people who are sanctioned with respect to Syria in other words, secondary sanctions. This steady drumbeat of designations on persons or entities that support the Assad regime will continue until Bashar al-Assad and his regime cease obstructing a peaceful political resolution of the conflict, as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

The Caesar Act seeks to deny the Assad regime the financial resources that his regime uses to fuel its campaign of violence and destruction that has killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, and it’s meant to send a clear signal that no external actor should enter into business with or otherwise enrich such a regime.

None of our Syria sanctions targets the humanitarian sector nor the legitimate trade of food or medicine that the Syrian people need or that regional neighbors export to the benefit of the Syrian people. We have clear waivers and general licenses in place that support the efforts of the humanitarian sector. And as we have also said in the past, the Caesar Act sanctions are not directed at harming Lebanon’s economy or the Lebanese people, and we believe they will not have a significant impact on legitimate economic activity in Lebanon.

Today’s State Department designations highlight the corrupt duplicity of the Assad regime. We have designated Bashar al-Assad’s barbarous First Division of the Syrian Arab Army. And instead of protecting the Syrian people, the First Division and other units of the Syrian military have attacked civilians with ruthless disregard for human life, and at the same time some of these military entities have developed extensive networks to divert assistance away from the Syrian people, to impose taxes on all goods, and, put simply, to enrich themselves off the misery of the Syrian people, and the First Division is certainly a prime example of that kind of behavior.

Today the State Department also designated Bashar al-Assad’s adult son Hafez Bashar al-Assad. The Assad and Akhras families should not enjoy the right to do business with anyone involved in the U.S. or EU financial sectors, or consider visiting the U.S. or Europe, while they arbitrarily detain, torture, and murder thousands of civilians.

Question: How do you view the sanctions’ effect on the Syrian regime and its supporters so far? And to what extent can these sanctions push the regime to engage in the peace process in the future?

DAS Rayburn: We think of course it’s early days to see the overall effect of the sanctions, but we do believe that the sanctions under the Caesar Act are already having an effect on the thinking of those inside the regime and those who are supporters of the Assad regime. We do believe that they are getting the message loud and clear that these economic sanctions will continue until they accede to a political solution, as called for by UNSCR 2254.

Question: The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus over a year ago. What level of business are you seeing between the UAE, which is an important U.S. ally, and Syria, and does that concern you? And then to talk about secondary sanctions, what about the assets of sanctioned individuals who have bank accounts and et cetera and businesses in the UAE, and will you start targeting banks who do business with these sanctioned individuals outside of Syria?

DAS Rayburn: There’s no exemption based on where people reside. There’s no exemption to the Caesar Act based on where people reside. And we have been – we have been sending very strong messages through diplomatic channels, and now obviously in our public statements, to tell our friends that everyone should respect the Caesar Act, the provisions in the Caesar Act. 

We can make no exceptions. And we’ve also urged our friends in many places around the world to wind down their business if they are involved with sanctioned individuals and entities or those that are likely to be sanctioned, and to not put us in the position of having to sanction them instead of spending our time sanctioning the Syrian regime and its associates. We’ve made very clear that we will not hold back from doing that, but we’ve really urged everyone not to put us in that position.

So far, we think that the sanctions are having a chilling effect on what was expected to be outside investment coming into Damascus, and we are – we are watchful for any such violations, and we will enforce the provisions in the Caesar Act no matter upon whom.

Question: You mentioned that you’ve already been discussing this with other jurisdictions and allies. Has there been any tangible impact? Have bank accounts been closed? Have banks or businesses or governments in other jurisdictions – I’m particularly thinking the UAE – taken any action that you can make us aware of?

DAS Rayburn: I think the thing that we would look for most is, has the investment happened? I mean the investment that I think people were expecting to come, I mean, not just from the Gulf region but from elsewhere. And it’s not materializing in the way that the Assad regime and its friends had hoped it would, and we think the Caesar Act and the other authorities that we’ve been able to – that we’ve demonstrated we will enforce have a big part in that.

Question: The comprehensive military agreement between Iran and Syria violated the UN arms embargo on Iran as well as the Caesar Act. Will the U.S. allow such agreement between Syria and Iran? What are you going to do to stop it?

DAS Rayburn: Iran’s only contributions to Syria – the Iranian regime’s only contributions to Syria so far have been violence and instability. And it’s not just that such activity, such military aid to the Assad regime, violates the Caesar Act; it’s pledged to – the Iranian regime’s pledge to export military equipment to Syria is in blatant defiance of the UN arms embargo under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and it’s a further demonstration of why we in the United States think it’s an imperative that the Security Council must act to extend the arms embargo on Iran.

Iranian regime support to the Assad regime has enabled Assad to commit mass atrocities against the Syrian people, it’s prolonged what is a brutal, needless war, and it’s contributed to the deaths of more than half a million people and the displacement of 11 million more Syrians. If Iran were truly concerned about the wellbeing and safety of the Syrian people, the Iranian regime would support the UN-led Syria political process under UNSCR 2254. 

The Iranian regime would withdraw the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hizballah, and other Iranian-backed terrorist forces that are under Iranian regime command from the entirety of Syria, and would embrace a political solution rather than a brutal military victory.

So it’s certainly not constructive for the Iranian regime to be seeking to deepen its military involvement in Syria through a military agreement with the Assad regime.

Question: If you can elaborate on the Lebanon part. Does Wassim al-Qattan have any investment or links in Lebanon? And on that same topic, the Lebanese Government seems to be seeking exemptions for the Caesar Act when it comes to electricity imports from Syria. Is that something that the U.S. is willing to consider?

DAS Rayburn: Okay, for Wassim Qattan, any specific Lebanese involvement, I don’t have that, Joyce. I can speak with the Treasury Department and get you a detailed answer on that. I know that the – I know the companies that we designated today that Wassim Qattan is involved with, whether he has any other overlapping interests maybe in companies that are not his own, I would have to check on.

In terms  of the Lebanese Government and any requests for exemptions, of course we have an established process to review requests for exemptions or licenses. we are looking at a number of those from different directions, and we haven’t made a decision on those. I would say that the bar would be very high for us to consider allowing a waiver or a license for activity that significantly benefited the Assad regime. We also in terms of Lebanon’s electricity situation, as I’ve pointed out in the past, the Assad regime is not the answer to Lebanon’s electricity difficulties. We know those electricity difficulties in Lebanon are extensive, but also, I mean, the Lebanese electricity sector, I think everyone recognizes that it’s going to have to undergo some significant head-to-toe reform if it’s to be put in a position to deliver basic electricity needs to the Lebanese people.

Question: How will the U.S. administration deal with Russia in light of its refusal of the sanctions imposed on Syria, and are you having talks with Moscow about this? And in light of the multiple sanctions imposed on Syria, how will Caesar sanctions affect the Syrian regime without harming the Syrian people?

DAS Rayburn: What’s harming the Syrian people, overwhelmingly, is the – is Bashar al-Assad and his regime’s atrocities against the Syrian people, not sanctions. And the sanctions that are being imposed on the Assad regime are actually meant to protect the Syrian people by trying to defer Bashar al-Assad – deter Bashar al-Assad and his friends from carrying out the atrocities against the Syrian people. But let’s be plain: the author of the Syrian people’s misery is Bashar al-Assad, that overwhelmingly he and his regime are to blame for the more than nine years of attacks that they have carried out against the Syrian people.

Now, we on the U.S. side, and I know our European allies are the same, we are conscientious about the suffering of the Syrian people, and that is why the Caesar Act has already written into it, in the law, the exemptions for humanitarian activity, for agricultural products and medical products and so on, so that those can continue to flow to the Syrian people in spite of the Assad regime’s behavior toward the Syrian people.

it’s a lie that the regime and its friends are promulgating that sanctions are the cause of the misery inside Syria right now. Very clearly, it’s Bashar al-Assad’s choices and the behavior of his regime. Since – Bashar al-Assad, since April 2019, made the decision to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a campaign to attack the people of Idlib instead of using that money to provide basic necessities for the Syrian people. That’s where the resources have gone, in addition to that vast corruption that takes place inside the Syrian regime, which diverts aid away from the Syrian people, which attempts to move money illicitly and to have illicit business empires, many of which we’re trying to shut down, both in the past and now. That’s why there are shortages inside Syria. It’s the regime, it’s Bashar al-Assad who is the author of all this.

And the first aspect of the question, of how will we deal with Russia in light of the sanctions. We are in very close consultation with our Russian counterparts all the time, and we continue to urge them to use the influence that they have on the Assad regime and we believe that that influence is quite extensive to use that influence to press the Assad regime to accede to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and to a political solution to the Syrian conflict.

Question: Are Iraqis going to be affected by these sanctions? Are they dealing with Syria in a way that is illegal, in your judgment?

DAS Rayburn: I think the answer is that we have seen for a long time the Iraqi militias, the Iraqi militant groups that are sponsored by the Iranian regime, have been dealing with the Syrian regime in a way that would clearly violate both the letter and the spirit of the Caesar Act as well as UN Security Council resolutions. So the answer is yes, there is some of that activity that goes on back and forth, and the Caesar Act is a tool that we will look at to try to deter that activity.

Question: I wanted to ask if the U.S. administration plans to intensify its diplomatic engagement with – with all partners, essentially, to look for that political solution that you mentioned before; or, alternatively, you are going to only intensify the sanctions – you’re going to only strengthen the sanctions regime as – and use it as the only tool in your toolbox?

DAS Rayburn: The sanctions, the U.S. sanctions, the intention of them is to enable diplomacy; it’s meant to enable a peaceful political solution to be achieved by diplomacy to the Syrian conflict. So sanctions are not a standalone tool. Sanctions can raise economic pressure on the Assad regime and its allies, but we also will continue to seek to raise political pressure. We will seek through intense diplomacy, which we do have, to try to press the Assad regime and its allies to come to the table in a meaningful way and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2254. It’s very straightforward. There are no hidden plans. it’s United States policy is to implement 2254.

Question: Can you please elaborate on the logic behind sanctioning Hafez al-Assad?

DAS Rayburn: There has been a trend among senior Syrian regime actors, both officials and businesspeople who are acting on behalf of the Assad regime, to do business through their adult family members to try to evade sanctions in that way. It’s also clear that there has been a rise to prominence among the war profiteers of Syria of the Akhras family. So we intend for today’s designation of Hafez Bashar al-Assad – it’s as a part of that. You would see in the past, for example, that we have designated the adult family members of Mohammed Hamsho and a few others. That is the trend because it has been such a prominent trend among Syrian regime actors to use their adult family members, whether those are siblings or children, to try to continue business in their place after being sanctioned.

Question: Related to Hafez Bashar al-Assad. I mean, the 17th of June you sanctioned Asma al-Assad, and now you’re sanctioning Hafez al-Assad. Is there any political message behind this or is it just related to economic and to the – just to the economic dimension? Is there any political dimension to that?

DAS Rayburn: we view them as one and the same, Ibrahim, the political and the economic, because it seems very clear that the immediate family of Bashar al-Assad and the in-laws together are attempting to consolidate economic power inside the Syrian regime, which they then would no doubt use to try to further consolidate political power. So for us, the point of the sanctions is to try to prevent the Assad regime from consolidating that kind of economic control, which it would then use to perpetuate the war and to perpetuate the killing machine against the Syrian people. So we view very much that, just as I think you would probably find with the Syrian regime’s inner circle view, that economic power and the political aspects are very closely, closely related.

DAS Rayburn: I would just like to say that as we’ve said before, this is a campaign that will continue. This will continue to be the summer of Caesar. We will continue these kinds of sanctions designations in the coming weeks and months and there will be no end to them until the Syrian regime and its allies accede to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2254 and put a stop to their attacks against the Syrian people so that the Syrian people can begin to heal from this conflict.

“In terms of flights, I really should redirect you to the airlines. They are the ones who make these decisions. In terms of admitting citizens – we are constantly re-evaluating and studying how this relates to the latest developments with the COVID-19 pandemic. In terms of travel restrictions, visa restrictions that we have introduced,” Free News reports the words of acting assistant Secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Reeker.

On Thursday, US Acting Assistant Secretary of State Philip Reeker said during a telephone press briefing in response to a Media question that air carriers themselves will make decisions on the resumption of air service between Russia and the US. Meanwhile, the US government will estimate the prospects of canceling the border restrictions introduced earlier.

Below is a full rush transcript of the Briefing with Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of European and Eurasian Affairs.

Ambassador Reeker: It’s really great to be back in Brussels. I guess I always say that, but this time I really mean it. This is my first trip since March the 12th, when I went back to Washington thinking we might go into a lockdown, like so many countries, as we faced the COVID-19 pandemic, and of course this ended up now being four-plus months, and we’re able now, traveling with Secretary Pompeo to London.

We flew in Monday, and it was the Secretary’s first overnight trip since COVID, taking all the appropriate precautions, but a chance to engage with our UK colleagues, counterparts. Of course, the Secretary met with Prime Minister Johnson and Foreign Secretary Raab. I think you would have seen the press conference that the foreign secretary and Secretary Pompeo held. We also had a chance to meet, of course, with our embassy team.  And the FCO, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, hosted a roundtable with British and American businesses which was a very useful chance to hear about their concerns, their priorities in terms of COVID recovery, economic recovery, and reopening being a priority for all of us, trying to do that safely and securely, working on travel restrictions and easing of those in terms of some of the waivers and exceptions, on both sides of the Atlantic, we’ve been able to do to start up again travel possibilities as part of our economic recovery. So I think it was a very successful and useful visit in London.

The Secretary then went on yesterday morning, Wednesday morning, to Copenhagen. This, of course, was a chance to visit after our earlier visit last year had been postponed, but a great opportunity to engage with our Danish allies, partners. We have a tremendous partnership with Denmark in so many areas: security, the prosperity agenda, also, of course, talking about COVID-19 and how we – steps we can take to recover our economies, and talking about the Danes’ preparation to take over leadership and command in Iraq of NATO operations there. There’s just a whole list of things that we work on together with Denmark.  And, of course, we talked about the Arctic, which, as you know, has been a strategic priority for us in terms of Arctic security.  And we had a really interesting and useful quadrilateral meeting with the foreign ministers of Denmark, of Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, so those three parts of the Kingdom of Denmark coming together with Secretary Pompeo to talk about engagement there. You may all be aware that we recently reopened, after many years, our consulate in Nuuk, in Greenland. We have now a presence there. It’s something that the Secretary helped spearhead for us. We had a good chat with the Faroese as well, a dialogue there, and, of course, doing this all in conjunction with our Danish colleagues. So, really, a great visit there.

The Secretary headed back yesterday to Washington and today he’s headed to California. You will have seen that he’ll be giving a speech at the Nixon Library there, talking about China.

I took the opportunity to come on down here this morning to Brussels and had some bilateral meetings with Belgian counterparts today, and then tomorrow I’ll meet with a long list of EU counterparts. It’s great to be able to do this in person again, although we’ve kept up good diplomatic contacts and connections over these months through the various platforms, just as we’ve tried through things like these calls to continue our engagement with you, our colleagues in the press. I hope to have a chance to discuss a whole range of issues with EU counterparts, but that will include the U.S.-EU dialogue about China, which High Representative Borrell proposed and the Secretary of State accepted. We’re excited about being able to do that. It’s a good opportunity to exchange views and thoughts as we all look at the concerns we have regarding some of the Chinese activity. You know we’ve talked about 5G, we’ve talked about human rights, Hong Kong, so we’re going to be working on the agenda and the plans for that dialogue, and it’s really a chance to review a whole set of transatlantic engagements that we carry out with the EU.

Let me stop there. I will be flying back then Saturday morning to Washington, but I do hope this is the beginning of more opportunities to travel. Of course, we’re watching very closely how things evolve with COVID. It’s one of the things that we spend a lot of time with our EU counterparts on, is making sure that we can restart more travel but do it safely, according to epidemiological information and working closely not only on the transport side of things, but the broader economic recovery plans as well.

Question: What Turkey is doing against Greece and Cyprus. President Trump and Secretary Pompeo asked, as I understand, Can you tell us what is going on there?

Ambassador Reeker: Well, I would note, as you’ve heard, that the United States has been deeply concerned by Turkey’s stated plans to survey for natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. We’re concerned about actions that are provocative and raise tensions in the region. Resource development in the Eastern Med, I think, is something that should promote cooperation. This is something that can provide a foundation for durable energy security and economic prosperity throughout the region. You know as well as I do that this is a complex strategic space. We want our friends and allies – and let’s remember, we’re all, Turkey, Greece, and the United States, all NATO allies – we want friends and allies in the region to approach these issues in a spirit of cooperation. And I would just echo the message that we’ve given before from Washington as well as elsewhere in Europe, urging Turkish authorities to halt operations that raise tensions, and we’ll continue to urge that message.

I think you may have seen comments today from Ambassador Pyatt in Alexandroupoli as well. So we keep in touch with both of our embassies in Athens and in Ankara, monitoring this situation very closely.

Question: Albanians respect you a lot. Prime Minister Rama broke the election reform agreement, which was signed in the U.S. Embassy. Is State Department going to tolerate ?

Ambassador Reeker: We think it was an important step in the right direction. We’re pleased that Ambassador Kim has been able to help, and help Albania move in that direction. Albania is a NATO ally, a candidate for EU membership, and has come a long way in many years. As you know, I’ve been involved in that part of the world for a long time, and we want to see positive developments in Albania, and it’s important that we see the election reform. It’s important that all sides of the political spectrum participate in the institutions. That’s what democracy is all about and that’s what we’ll continue to engage in and to monitor and to encourage from all parts of the Albanian political spectrum.

Question: According to the Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2021, 15 percent of the funds that was made available under assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia for direct assistance to the central Government of Georgia may not be obligated until the Secretary of State determines and reports to the committees on appropriations that Georgian Government is taking effective steps to strengthen democratic institutions, combat corruption, and ensure that the rule of law in the private sector is consistent with internationally recognized standards. Ambassador, this is a very unprecedented event when it comes to the Georgian Government, and your answer will be very much important on this. How serious is this cutting 15 percent of the foreign aid to Georgia? And what Georgian people should expect from the State Department to report to the relevant committees?

Ambassador Reeker: Well, thanks for the question because, certainly, we pay a lot of attention to the Caucasus. We have strong relationships there, and that includes, of course, with the Republic of Georgia, which is an important partner in so many ways and has been for many years. I don’t want to delve into congressional views and legislation and get ahead of any steps that may be taken or determinations that may be made, but what I can tell you is that we continue to work very closely with Georgia. Our embassy there, under Ambassador Degnan, remains extremely active and we’re in close touch with them. I’d hoped to travel to Georgia and the Caucasus just when the COVID pandemic brought all of that travel to a standstill, and I’d like to resurrect those travel plans. So we’re watching conditions closely and hope to get back out there and continue that.

But regardless of travel by senior officials, it’s what happens on the ground that is important, and certainly our embassy remains in very close contact on that and we will continue to monitor the situation and also, of course, keep in close touch with Congress, which has a great interest in the region as well.

Question: My question about relations between Kosovo and Serbia. What is the state of play in terms of American engagement now that the European Union has taken again, as they claim, the driver’s seat? Is there any cooperation or coordination between Washington and Brussels, or you’re going to continue with two separate processes, as it was the case until June 24th? And on that note, has U.S. administration had any kind of contact with Kosovo President Hashim Thaci since the confirmation that he is being charged about war crimes and crimes against humanity? 

Ambassador Reeker: As you know, I have a long history on that region and, indeed, on that process, having supported, when I was deputy assistant secretary some years back, the European Union’s very robust and important activities through the dialogue toward normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. That still remains an important priority for us. We think they need to work to find solutions, so we certainly welcome that opportunity. As you know, the Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell worked on an economic track to help the two countries find ways where they could improve their economies – in other words, improve the lives of their people. As neighbors, that’s going to be inevitable and an important part of helping them find direction in terms of normalization and moving ahead on their longer-term goals and priorities, and continuing to encourage greater stability and security in the region.

There were some big steps taken in terms of agreements toward air and rail links, and we would still encourage them to work on those. I think it’s great that the new EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak is working. He’s gotten down to – Miroslav is a good friend and colleague who knows the region and the issues extremely well. I will have an opportunity to meet with him tomorrow here in Brussels. I look forward to that. And we will continue to be engaged and supportive of the process and to see through progress in that direction. We think both countries can make big steps in that regard. Our embassies both in Belgrade and in Pristina remain active and in close contact with the respective governments to encourage them to find ways forward, and we’ll continue to talk to the EU and other interested parties about that process, and I’m just glad to see that there is a return to the dialogue and we’ll continue to support that as well.

Question: Your trip includes planning for the U.S.-EU dialogue on China, and I’m just wondering what the goals are from the U.S. side on that. Is there a consensus between the parties on the structure of that dialogue? Will there be a formal decision-making body, for instance?

Ambassador Reeker: This is a great opportunity to sort of do it in person. We’ve been in touch over the – through the different contacts, all of these new-fangled platforms that we all use in terms of communication. You’ll recall that the Secretary announced last month – I think it was June 25th – that he was pleased to accept High Rep Borrell’s proposal and establish this dialogue on the People’s Republic of China. It just gives us a new mechanism for discussing and analyzing the concerns that the transatlantic community has about the threats that the PRC poses to some of our shared democratic values, the threats to the international rules-based order, some of the things we’ve begun to realize and speak out about. Certainly, you’ve seen the Secretary’s remarks; it was on our agenda both in London and in Copenhagen this week in talking about that.

We are going to work to develop a sort of framework for how we do this. I know the Secretary himself and High Rep Borrell look forward to launching this. We don’t have an exact date yet. Some of it, of course, still ties in with limitations of COVID, but we’d like to do that in person. So more news to come on that, but I think that it’s a chance to talk about COVID and recovery and the role of China in that, and then look at our resilience, perhaps talk about things like supply chains, certainly talk about human rights, what’s been going on in the west, the Uyghurs, Chinese treatment of its Muslim populations; Hong Kong is an issue that’s right at the fore right now. And so we’ll have a full agenda, and this week I do hope to be able to sort of work out a little more in terms of the details of how we’ll do that, pull together a plan.

So we will hope to offer more on that as it comes out. I would expect that we’d get underway after the August break, and this will be, as I said, a mechanism that can meet over time, perhaps have a level below the minister – ministerial level that can work on various issues just to share ideas, viewpoints. I think we are very successful when the transatlantic community does this, looks at challenges we have and shares information on how we can move ahead and deal with some of these challenges, and help China to see that they need to be a part of the international rules-based order, and we can analyze our concerns about that together. We hope this will be sort of action-oriented and lead to some more coordinated policy outcomes that can advance our shared interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

Question: I was hoping you could update us on where things stand in relations to, with regards to U.S.-Russian relations. And I also wanted to ask you if Secretary Pompeo has plans to reciprocate and travel to Russia anytime soon considering the fact that Minister Lavrov was in Washington, D.C., in December? And lastly, do the two sides currently engage – are currently engaged in any talks about a resumption of regular commercial flights in light of what’s going on with the pandemic?

Ambassador Reeker: I certainly don’t have any travel to announce for Secretary Pompeo. As I said, he’s been in Europe, in London and Copenhagen. He’s in California today. I know he’s able to speak to Foreign Minister Lavrov among the many, many calls he has with foreign leaders and counterparts.

In terms of flights, I’d really have to refer you to airlines, who are the ones that really make those decisions. In terms of admission of individuals, we are constantly reassessing and looking at how that fits in with the latest developments in the COVID pandemic in terms of travel restrictions, visa restrictions that we’ve had. It’s not something that the Secretary himself would be directly involved in.

And of course, we’ve made very clear the areas of concern we have with the Russian Federation on a number of issues, from interference in our elections, their invasion of Ukraine, and occupation of Georgia. These are areas that certainly restrain our relations, and a series of other challenges we have bilaterally. But we will continue through our embassies to maintain those contacts and continue to call upon the Russian Federation to act in a responsible manner.

Question: I would like to know, in terms of China, if you have received any indication from the Italian Government about the decision they have to make about Huawei and 5G. And the second question, if possible, if there is any progress in the talks to let the Schengen Area citizens to travel back to the United States? 

Ambassador Reeker: We have undertaken ,  you may have seen some of the announcements in the last week or so – to implement some additional waivers and exemptions to the travel restrictions that were put in place because of COVID-19. We certainly have appreciated the transparency and efforts of our European partners to do the same. The Secretary spoke about this on these stops in London and Copenhagen. We’re really trying hard, working closely with friends in Europe and the EU proper, to determine how we can best safely reopen international travel and make sure that all the elements are in place to do that appropriately. And I think – I’m confident that in coming weeks we are going to figure out even more ability, ultimately to be able to lift the various limitations and restrictions that we have. But for now we have been able to restart a significant amount of travel for economic and business purposes, for students and others, and we’re continuing – the State Department, but along with other partners, the Department of Transportation and Department of Homeland Security – to develop full plans and methods by which we can get travel back into place.

Your first question was regarding Italy and its decisions in terms of the 5G networks and Huawei. I’ll let the Government of Italy speak to any things they want to announce and decisions they want to take. We’ve made very clear our concerns. The security of our networks is paramount. This is the challenge with China; one of the challenges is how over a period of years – and the Secretary spoke to this – that we were not attentive as China stole and scooped up our intellectual property, developed new technological systems, used their state-linked enterprises then to market these back to us. And our data is what’s at stake. Our data, your data, the data of Americans, Europeans, our friends and allies is what we’re concerned about here, and having the Chinese Communist Party be able to store and access that data. That’s really what this discussion is about, and finding trusted vendors for our high-tech and IT infrastructure. That’s the crucial thing here. We’re confident that the Italian Government will make the right decisions for the Italian people to make sure that their data, their security, is fully protected.

Question: The United States have recently blacklisted, put sanctions on various companies that are connected to the crimes in Xinjiang, and this is interesting because we still have a lot of European companies who right now are doing business with these blacklisted Chinese companies, they are collaborating with these blacklisted Chinese companies. What’s your recommendation to European companies that are doing business with these blacklisted companies in China?

Ambassador Reeker: Well, certainly as those announcements made clear, we are trying to bring to the fore what is going on there. This is an important human rights question. What’s been carried out by the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Republic of China against their own citizens is something we should all be concerned about, and what our announcements have made clear is that those who are doing business there should be aware of exactly what they’re doing and what it means, and I think they speak for themselves. Those announcements are quite clear, and we’re watching this very, very closely.

You mentioned that you are based in Hong Kong, and we, of course, are very concerned about what’s happened in Hong Kong as well. This was a topic of the Secretary’s conversations in London as well as in Denmark, and it certainly will be something I discuss here with counterparts at the EU. So we’re going to continue to make clear that these are important issues, and as the Chinese Communist Party, the regime, People’s Republic of China, has been committing actions against its own people that we find particularly intolerable, and we’re going to continue to speak out about it.

Ambassador Reeker: It’s always difficult on these things to cover the whole range of issues, but I hope we can do this again and I hope I can get back to Brussels again soon, and just to wish all of you a safe and healthy summer. I hope you’re doing all right as we continue to all together deal with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. So, wishing you all the best. Thanks. Thanks, Justin.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) states that, according to official information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Romanian Embassy in Oslo, people traveling from Romania to the Kingdom of Norway will continue to be subject to the procedure currently in force after the date of July 15, namely they will be placed in self-isolation for a period of 10 days from the moment of entry into Norwegian territory, the MAE shows in a press release sent to Media.

Moreover, according to the Norwegian authorities, from July 15, the self-isolation measure will be applied depending on the residence of the person in question, so that Romanian citizens with permanent residence in one of the countries exempt from this measure, will no longer be required to self-isolate.

Norway today announced that it is relaxing its strict quarantine rules for many European arrivals but only people living in three Swedish regions will be allowed to travel freely between the two countries from the middle of next week.

Trips to and from Kronoberg, Skåne and Blekinge will be unrestricted from July 15th, but the rest of the country, including Värmland along the Norwegian border is still off-limits due to the rate of Covid-19 infection.

Residents of those three regions are also allowed to travel to neighbouring Denmark, as well as residents of Västerbotten, with Skåne residents allowed to cross the Öresund bridge as of tomorrow.

Sweden’s official recommendation against non-essential travel to most countries, including Norway and Denmark, is still in place, but that is due to be reviewed again next week.

Starting 15 July, the Government plans to allow the entry of foreign nationals from countries outside the EU/EEA (referred to as third-country nationals) who have family or an established romantic relationship in Norway. However, no exemptions are to be granted from quarantine duty or from ordinary provisions of the Immigration Act.

‘The Government is constantly working to strike the right balance between controlling infections and opening up. The current infection situation in Norway makes it possible for us to open up a little more. And since the entry restrictions we introduced as a result of the coronavirus have been so hard on families and romantic partners, I am happy we can now ease these a bit more for countries outside the EU and the EEA,’ said Minister of Justice and Public Security Monica Mæland.

‘But we must emphasise,’ she added, ‘that the entry restriction rules are in addition to the ordinary rules of entry contained in the Immigration Act. That means even if the entry restrictions are removed, the usual requirements for travel documents, visas etc. will continue to apply in full.’

The right of entry for foreign nationals moving to Norway as a result of family immigration is now to be fully reintroduced. Accordingly, family members who had been entitled to enter Norway to apply for a residence permit before the entry restrictions were imposed will once again have the opportunity to do so.

Quarantine rules still apply to family members and romantic partners 

‘Romantic partners and family members must obey the general quarantine rules and remain in quarantine for 10 days, just like others who travel into Norway,’ the Minister of Justice and Public Security said. They must also submit documentation stating that they will live continuously at one address for 10 days, or for the period they will be here if that is less than 10 days.

While family members and romantic partners requiring a visa will thus enjoy the same right of entry as before the virus outbreak, it is important to be aware that practical challenges remain in some parts of the world with regard to submitting a visa application. The reason is that application centres abroad may be closed or have reduced capacity due to infection control concerns. The Norwegian authorities have limited or no ability to influence this. In recent weeks, however, more and more application centres have been opening as the countries where the application centres operate gradually relax their national restrictions.

An increase in the number of arrivals from third countries could potentially entail the import of coronavirus cases, causing Norway’s infection situation to deteriorate. The Government will therefore keep a close eye on developments and provide clear information about the responsibility to undergo quarantine and the infection control guidelines in force at any given time.

The changes are as follows:

Foreign nationals planning to move to or visit Norway: 

• The right of entry for foreign nationals who plan to move to Norway as a result of family immigration is to be fully reintroduced. Accordingly, visa-free family members who had been entitled to enter Norway to apply for a residence permit before the entry restrictions were imposed will once again have the opportunity to do so.
• Family members requiring a visa may be granted an entry visa to stay in Norway pending their application review, according to ordinary rules in the Immigration Act and applicable guidelines of the Directorate of Immigration dating from before the COVID-19 outbreak.
• Family visits by close family members are also to be accommodated by the repeal of entry restrictions on visiting third-country nationals who have family members in Norway.
• “Family members” in this context refers to spouses/partners/cohabitants, parents and children under the age of 21, as well as stepfamily.

Entry by partners in a romantic relationship 

• In addition to family members, the Government plans to allow the entry of romantic partners. Parties are required to have met each other physically, and to have been in the relationship for a period of at least nine months.
• The person who lives in Norway must submit a self-declaration which the relationship partner must present on arrival in Norway, confirming that the two requirements have been met.

Next step: General entry from certain countries outside Schengen area/EEA 

Since 17 March the Schengen area, of which Norway is a part, has been temporarily closed for non-essential travel. The Council of the European Union has adopted a recommendation on easing the temporary restrictions and allowing entry from certain countries outside the Schengen area. Norway is following up this recommendation and aims to remove entry restrictions for certain third countries on the EU’s list to the extent the infection situation allows.

‘We are continuing our gradual, controlled opening to travel. The Government wants to build on the experience we gain as travel activities increase in the Nordic region and Europe before we open up to countries outside,’ said Ms Mæland.

Which countries to include initially and the exact time of opening are under consideration, with a decision to be announced at a later date. In accordance with established practice, the assessment of countries will be based on specific criteria, including the infection situation.

Last week the Nordic Foreign Ministers received the report “Nordic Foreign and Security Policy 2020: Climate Change, Hybrid & Cyber Threats and Challenges”.

On 30 October 2019, the foreign ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden decided to task Mr. Björn Bjarnason of Iceland to prepare an independent report with non-binding proposals on how to further develop Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy. This tasking marked ten years since Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway drafted a similar report presenting a range of recommendations of which a large share have already been implemented.

In the mandate, delivered to Mr. Bjarnason on 2 December 2019, he was requested to specifically focus on the scope for cooperation in addressing global climate change, addressing hybrid threats and cyber issues, and strengthening and reforming multilateralism and the rule-based international order. The mandate moreover stipulated that the report and the proposals should be ready by mid-year 2020. In his work he enjoyed the support of a reference group of experts and analysts from each of the five Nordic countries.

The Nordic Foreign Ministers express their appreciation to Mr. Bjarnason for his important work and look forward to studying the report’s recommendations. They will formally discuss the concrete proposals at their meeting in Copenhagen in September during Denmark’s presidency of the N5 cooperation.

United States has pledged more than $696 million in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable and conflict-affected Syrians.  This includes over $272 million of humanitarian assistance inside Syria and over $423 million for refugee-hosting countries in the region said Ambassador James Jeffrey, U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.  

These funds bring the total United States funding for the Syrian response to more than 11.3 billion in humanitarian assistance and over $1.3 billion in non-humanitarian and stabilization assistance across the region since the conflict began.  This U.S. contribution is our largest single contribution to date.  It will provide lifesaving food, safe drinking water, shelter, education, medical care, mental health and psychosocial support, hygiene supplies, and improved sanitation to assist millions of Syrians in need Ambassador said.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference with Ambassador James Jeffrey, U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; Richard Albright, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; and Matthew Nims, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau

for Humanitarian Assistance

Ambassador Jeffrey:  I have been participating in the joint European Union-UN-Brussels IV humanitarian assistance to Syria conference virtually.  This morning at the conference, the United States has pledged more than $696 million in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable and conflict-affected Syrians.  This includes over $272 million of humanitarian assistance inside Syria and over $423 million for refugee-hosting countries in the region.  

These funds bring the total United States funding for the Syrian response to more than 11.3 billion in humanitarian assistance and over $1.3 billion in non-humanitarian and stabilization assistance across the region since the conflict began.  This U.S. contribution is our largest single contribution to date.  It will provide lifesaving food, safe drinking water, shelter, education, medical care, mental health and psychosocial support, hygiene supplies, and improved sanitation to assist millions of Syrians in need.

During the conference this morning, not only did I as the American representative but many, many other delegates talked about the sobering circumstances in Syria with more than 11 million people in need of continuing humanitarian assistance.  What again and again delegates argued was that it is absolutely important to ensure humanitarian assistance, that UN Security Council Resolution 2504, which was passed in January and covers cross-border humanitarian assistance, must be renewed for 12 months and authorization must be restored for the UN to ship cross-border into northeast Syria at the al-Yarubiyah crossing, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.  This is critical because that resolution has to be renewed before the 10th of July or cross-border humanitarian assistance, which would be a dramatic disaster for the people inside Syria, would be ended, at least as authorized by the UN.  

In general, what I and many others urged was that the international community support UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen’s call for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, in particular beginning in Idlib, and support his work to achieve a lasting political solution to the conflict in line with Resolution 2254.  

For more than nine years, the Assad regime has waged a bloody war against the Syrian people and committed innumerable atrocities, some of which rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Therefore, as a side event to the Brussels IV humanitarian conference, on Friday, the U.S. co-hosted with Italy and Belgium an event focused on accountability and civilian protection in Syria, who we heard from the UN commission of inquiry and a number of civil society voices who discussed the scale and severity of the abuses being committed against civilians across Syria.  We also heard people discuss the OPCW special inquiry into the complicity of the Syrian Government at the highest levels in chemical weapons attacks in 2017.  

One conclusion that we have that I think we share with most people participating in this conference is that we are at a critical juncture.  Together, the international community must stand firm and insist that there will be no diplomatic or economic normalization of the Assad regime until there is a political solution to the conflict in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.  Thus, it is time for Assad’s needless, brutal war to end.  We will continue to work with our partners and allies to support the Syrian people and work towards a political solution to the conflict.

Question:  Kremlin just said that they will have on Wednesday a virtual conference with Iran and Turkey about the same subject, rebuilding of Syria.  Will Washington cooperate with these countries on this effort?  And if yes, in what capacity?  And if not, why? And second question on press reports about plan of Russians to pay money to Taliban for killing American soldiers in Afghanistan, my question is to Ambassador James Jeffrey:  Were you aware about this information? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  On the first question, the United States does not see the Astana Group as a particularly helpful way to resolve the Syrian conflict.  It has worked out a number of ceasefire agreements and all, but Idlib – those ceasefire agreements have been totally trashed and Assad’s forces have gone in, so we don’t see it being a contribution there.  It has, at times, attempted to seize the initiative on finding a peaceful resolution from the UN, from Geir Pedersen, the current UN envoy, and his predecessors.  We’re opposed to that as well.

We, of course, cooperate very closely with Turkey on various aspects of the situation in Syria, and we have frequent discussions with the Russians on a possible way to end the conflict.  But we don’t deal with the Astana group as an entity, and, of course, we have nothing to do with Iran.  Our whole policy in Syria is predicated upon, among other things, all Iranian-commanded forces withdrawing from the country.  

Question:  Is the situation in Syria safe and stable enough for Western countries to begin repatriating refugees?  Also, when it happens without the active participation of the refugees in question?

Ambassador Jeffrey:  First of all, no repatriation should occur without the active participation of the refugees in question.  Secondly, we rely on the UNHCR to – and the guidelines that the UNHCR has laid out that all repatriations should be voluntary, should be safe, and should be dignified.  The UNHCR is not in the business of certifying areas for refugee return per se, but it watches the situation in Syria very, very closely.  We, the United States, do not think that the situation in most parts of Syria is conducive for people going back right now.  But let me ask Rich Albright from our PRM Bureau to discuss further this question.  Rich.

DAS Albright:  It’s not – we don’t consider conditions safe, and then we’re not seeing any significant returns of population into Syrian government-controlled areas.  So, it’s really up to the Syrians themselves to make these decisions for themselves free of coercion and to make a decision on where they choose to go.  And so far, we’re not seeing any significant movement into regime-controlled areas. 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  There has been some movement back to areas that the Turkish Government or its allies and the Syrian opposition control.  The Turkish foreign minister this morning claimed 400,000 have returned from Turkey of the some 3 million-plus that are in Turkey, refugees.  That may be a little bit high, but I’m just putting it out because that’s what we heard. 

Question:  How can the political process be pushed to end the Syrian crisis, which will not be solved with aid but by returning Syrians to their homeland and starting the reconstruction process? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  That’s why we support Geir Pedersen’s call for a nationwide ceasefire.  That’s why we support the ceasefire in Idlib.  That’s why we worked for essentially a ceasefire with the Turks in the northeast back in October.  That’s why we deconflict movements on the ground and in the air with the Russians, all to try to limit the military dimension of this conflict. 

Secondly, there has to be a political process that will allow the people who have fled Assad; that is, 12 million people have left Assad’s controlled areas of Syria either to cross the border into Turkey, Jordan, or Lebanon, or to go into areas where Assad’s brutal forces do not hold sway.  Until there is a different relationship between the Assad regime or some successor regime and the Syrian people, you’re not going to get people to return, and you’re not going to get a resolution of this conflict, which is not only between Assad and most of his population, it’s also pulled in various outside countries – Turkey obviously, Iran, Russia, the United States, and the Defeat ISIS Coalition, and although we don’t confirm it officially, Israel at times has indicated that it has conducted operations in there to defend itself as well.  

So it’s a very complicated geostrategic problem as well as a humanitarian and an internal conflict problem.  And it all has to be resolved in a comprehensive way for any of the good things that we all want to happen to happen; that is, a restoration of the country to normalcy, the return of the population, peace, and prosperity.  

Question:  What is your first assessment for the first batch of sanctions on Syria based on the Caesar law?  And when should we expect the second batch? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  We are working very hard to come up with additional packages that we can announce.  I can’t give you a date, but as I said, we are working very hard.  We believe it’s very important to keep the pressure on the regime.  Again, it’s hard to measure the specific impact of these sanctions because what they do is they inhibit the individuals or the entities we sanction from having access to the dollar-denominated international banking system as well as the banking system in the United States, and we block people from traveling to the United States.  

But there’s a psychological impact of such sanctions on the individuals that you target.  Thus, we have chosen people in top leadership positions in the Assad family, in the military leadership.  And there’s also a secondary impact on the regime’s ability to fund its war against its own people because there are concerns that the banking system internationally has when you’re dealing with a country whose leaders are themselves personally under sanction. 

So those are secondary effects.  But while it’s hard to pin them down in a concrete fashion, we believe that they have a quite substantial, over time, impact on the regime’s calculus. 

Question:  United States does take initiatives. Even in Korea, you did it right now, or recently in the Middle East.  You do it elsewhere.  Why the mightiest country does not take the initiative to seek, at least to look for a solution in the Security Council of the UN?  Instead, you are concerned about Iran and others do and Russia and so forth.  Why isn’t it – there is no initiative of the U.S.? 

Ambassador Jeffrey:  Well, there is an initiative of the U.S.  The U.S. was one of the sponsors of the relevant Resolution 2254, passed in December of 2015.  The problem since then has been that the Damascus regime under Assad, supported by Russia and Iran, have refused to adhere to the provisions of that resolution that call for a nationwide ceasefire, that call for a constitutional committee to work assiduously to put together a new constitution that would reflect the needs of the people and UN-sponsored nationwide elections.  

That was the agenda five years ago in 2015.  That is the agenda of the Security Council.  That is the agenda of the United States.  What we’re seeing is a refusal of one side to adhere to that.  Therefore, we’re using sanctions.  We’re using other measures to try to pressure Assad and his supporters to return to the one political process that is universally recognized internationally.  That’s what we’re doing. 

Women’s suffrage campaign material produced in the USA as part of the historical Washington suffrage procession which took place on 3 March 1913, indicates that US women considered Norway as the most advanced country in the world in terms of women’s suffrage.

The Washington procession in 1913 is considered to be a turning point of the US suffrage movement for the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 1920, granting women the right to vote.

The campaign material entitled “Official Program-Woman Suffrage Procession, Washington, D.C. March 3, 1913” listed four countries under the heading “Countries Where Women Have Full Suffrage”. It listed them from top to bottom in the order of Norway, Finland, New Zealand and Australia.

It is noteworthy that Norway was listed at the top of the list because it is widely thought in the world today that New Zealand was the first country to give women the right to vote.

The list did not explicitly state that Norway had achieved women’s suffrage first among the four countries. It seems that the order was decided by the totality of their history of women’s suffrage, not just by the year in which the right to vote was granted to women.

The compilers of the list must have taken such factors as to whether or not a country was a sovereign state, the year in which universal suffrage was adopted for all municipal elections, the year when women obtained the right to stand for election to  Parliament (Stortinget in Norway), and the year in which women actually sat in Parliament.

The decision to list Norway at the top must have involved Alice Paul as she was the main figure who organised the Washington procession. She was described by former US president Barack Obama in his Presidential Proclamation 9423 as “the most prominent figure in the final phase of the battle for the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution”. She was highly educated, and obtained her Doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania in 1912 by submitting a thesis entitled “The Legal Position of Women in Pennsylvania”.

The campaign material has been found among the prints of the digital archives of the US Library of Congress by Dr Hisashi Nakamura, a Japanese author who has just published a book in Japanese entitled “The Women who Changed the Constitution: Alice Paul and the National Woman’s Party”. 

He says “It is significant that the suffragettes in the USA were aware of the suffrage movements in the world in detail and more than a hundred years ago realised that Norway was a forerunner of the movement. The Official Program-Woman Suffrage Procession paid homage to the women of Norway. They should be proud of their historical achievement. The Norwegian women who achieved this should be more widely recognised worldwide.”

( Written by Hisashi Nakamura )