The United States will not grant any more waivers to any countries that would allow them to buy Iranian oil without facing U.S. sanctions, a senior U.S. diplomat said on Wednesday.

United States is looking to sign a new agreement with Iran that covers its nuclear and missile programs, the country’s regional aggression and the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals including Americans, according to US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook.

The US responded to flare ups in tensions with Iran with Iran’s Special Envoy Brian Hook vowing that any attack against the United States or its allies would be met with a show of force.

Hook assured an unsettled market that it had already factored in Iran’s oil exports falling to zero. Oil prices were up in afternoon trading, with WTI up over 1 percent on the day.

The strong words from the United States came after Iran announced it would no longer be curbing its nuclear program, threatening to go even further, saying it would resume enriching uranium at a higher level if the EU fails to live up to its end of the agreement by continuing Iranian oil purchases.

The United States had announced on Tuesday that it was deploying the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force to the U.S. Central Command region “to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime.”

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Brian Hook, Special Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State and Victoria Coates, Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Middle Eastern Affairs, NSC, on U.S. policy achievements since withdrawing from the JCPOA one year ago.

Mr. Hook:  One year ago today President Trump announced that the United States would cease its participation in the Iran Nuclear Deal.  Shortly thereafter Secretary Pompeo, within a few weeks of the President’s decision, presented a bold new strategy to address Iran’s, to comprehensively address Iran’s threats to peace and security, and importantly, to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon.  We will never be held hostage to the Iranian regime’s nuclear blackmail, and outside of the deal we are in a much better position to address the full range of Iran’s destabilizing activities.

The new strategy that we launched shortly after the President left the deal has had a lot of new initiatives, new lines of effort, and we are seeing positive impacts.

We have imposed the toughest sanctions ever on this Iranian regime.  We have designated nearly 1,000 individuals and entities since the beginning of the administration.  We have taken Iran’s oil exports to historic lows.  And we have stopped issuing oil waivers to those who import Iranian oil, which means zeroing out the purchases of Iranian crude.

We have also tightened nuclear restrictions that impede Iran’s ability to reconstitute its past nuclear weapons program, and prevent Iran from shortening the time that it would take to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

I think you saw the regime’s announcement that it intends to expand its nuclear program.  This is in defiance of international norms, and it is an attempt to hold the world hostage.  Its threat to renew the nuclear work is something that we are going to be examining very closely.  It’s too early to speculate on the technical significance of any nuclear activities until we see what, if anything, happens.

So when you look at where we are now, a year on, we are still committed to denying the regime all paths to a nuclear weapon.  We will continue to expose maximum pressure on the regime until it abandons its destabilizing ambitions.  We call on the international community to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its threat to expand its nuclear program.

I would say in the last year we have done a good job of increasing Iran’s diplomatic isolation as more allies and partners have stepped up over the last year to counter Iranian aggression with us.  We have acted with countries from nearly every continent to disrupt Iran’s rogue oil shipping operations.  The European Union passed new sanctions against Iranian entities in response to two foiled terror plots last year.  And other nations have responded to Iran’s terrorism and threats of terrorism by recalling ambassadors, expelling Iranian diplomats, eliminating visa-free travel, denying landing rights to Mahan Air.

As outlined in the 12 demands in the Secretary’s May 21^st speech — and I would just remind you that the first three of those demands concern Iran’s nuclear program — we will continue to apply maximum pressure on the regime until its leaders change their behavior.  They have got to start behaving more like a normal nation and less like a revolutionary cause.  They need to respect the rights of the Iranian people.  And we are committed to standing with the Iranian people, restoring deterrence against Iran’s threats to peace and security, and denying the regime the revenue that it needs to fund its foreign policy.  We are well on our way to making Iran’s foreign policy prohibitively expensive.

Dr. Coates:  It’s a pleasure to participate in this with you today after all the hard work that’s gone into implementing the President’s strategy.

I just wanted to point out that a year ago there was a very firmly held set of points in conventional wisdom that were going to occur if the United States decided to withdraw from the JCPOA.  It said with great certainty that the United States would be isolated, our sanctions unilaterally would be ineffective, and investment would pour into Iran, rendering us feckless and powerless.  

Now President Trump’s stated goal for our Iran strategy is to fundamentally change the Iranian regime’s behavior so it no longer threatens the U.S. and our allies and it never possesses a nuclear weapon.  Whether Tehran chooses a future of opportunity and prosperity for the Iranian people or doubles down on the failed policies of the last 40 years that brought it to this impasse is yet to be seen, but the President has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the United States retains unprecedented economic clout that can eventually cripple Iran’s economy if they do not change course.

The President’s guidance is to continue increasing this pressure through actions such as designating the IRGC a foreign terrorist organization and bringing the oil waivers to zero until Tehran is compelled to negotiate on terms favorable to the U.S. or choose between survival and exporting terror as it will not be able to do both.

President Trump’s offers to meet with the Iranian regime are sincere, and it is his hope that they will accept and begin to build the better future that the people of Iran deserve. 

Question:  About the Iranian movement of its ballistic missile to the Gulf and the U.S. announcement after that that it will send an aircraft carrier.  What is your comment, or how does this affect the stability of the region?

Mr. Hook:  We had indications of heightened Iranian readiness to conduct offensive operations against U.S. forces and our interests in the Middle East, so we had indications of multiple credible threats by Iranian forces and we repositioned our military assets accordingly.

We deployed the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and a bomber task force to send a clear message to the Iranian regime, and that message is any attack on U.S. interests or on those of our allies will be met with force.  The United States does not seek war with Iran, but we are ready to defend U.S. forces and interests in the region.

If the Iranian regime chooses to escalate its already violent behavior, the United States will respond.

I would also just add, I’ve seen some people connect Iran’s threats with our designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards as, that designation as maybe one reason why this is happening.  After we designated the Revolutionary Guards as a foreign terrorist organization, Iran’s response was to threaten with more terrorism, which kind of proves our point.  This is a regime that insists on behaving like a terrorist regime, and if you don’t agree with them they threaten even more terrorism.  And as I said earlier at the top of the call, we are not going to give Iran a veto over our national security, and we will continue to work with allies and partners in the region and beyond to restore deterrence against the range of threats to peace and security that this regime presents.

Dr. Coates:  I’d just add to that, Brian, this impasse we find ourselves in right now that Deena was asking about, this is hardly new.  They’ve been doing this for 40 years.  They started out by taking our diplomats hostage.  You can go through 1983, the Beirut Marine Barracks bombing.  This is their chosen tool of statecraft.  So connecting one sort of episode of threatened violence with the IRGC designation just doesn’t make sense.

Question:  How come almost the whole world, at least most of Europe and China and Russia and so forth don’t see any violation of the treaty including the UN Agency in Vienna, only the ladies and gentlemen in Washington do see that, do stress that, maybe a little bit supported by non-members of the treaty like Israel or so.  Isn’t it just so that you in Washington want regime change in Tehran as the real request?

Mr. Hook:  Perhaps you haven’t been looking at the statements made by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State on down.  We have said repeatedly that we are seeking a change in the regime’s behavior.  And it is true that Iran has been in compliance with these reports, but we should be surprised if they’re not in compliance.  The bar for compliance was set so low by the Iran Nuclear Deal that we expect them to stay in compliance.

At some point their calculus may change, but this was a sweetheart deal that Iran got more than it gave in the deal.  It was a disproportionately weighted deal.  It is a modest, it is a non-proliferation plan of modest and temporary benefits.  

I would remind everyone that the Iran Deal is going to start expiring in 18 months.  The first of its provisions, the arms embargo and the travel ban on people that are listed in 2231 expire.  And then you’re going to have a regular cycle of restrictions lift on Iran.  So it is false to say that the Iran Nuclear Deal solved the Iran nuclear problem.  It delayed addressing the problem.  And we thought that this deal presented Iran with a patient pathway to acquire a nuclear weapon, and so we decided to get out of the deal.  And now outside of the deal we think that we’re in a much better position to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon by this new approach that we’re taking.

Dr. Coates:  I have nothing further to add.  I would point out that the JCPOA is not a treaty.

Mr. Hook:  It’s also, people don’t know this.  I’m not sure why.  It’s not legally binding.  It is a political plan.  It is a political commitment that was made four years ago by a President who is no longer in office.  It has no legal status.  If you look at UN Security Council Resolution 2231, it is not legally binding.  And there are other things in that, that are legally binding.  For example, the travel ban, the assets freeze, the arms embargo.  Those, and [NXP] are all still operational.  But this is not a treaty.  It is not an agreement.  All you have do to is look at the name.  The JCPOA is the Joint Comprehensive Plan, and I was in a meeting with Foreign Minister Zarif where he made it very clear to everybody in the room that it’s not an agreement.  It’s only a plan.  Because they couldn’t agree on calling it an agreement.  Our response to that is if it’s just a plan, then plans can be changed.

Question:  what kind of new sanctions is the administration planning to continue the pressure campaign, if any?  And the second question, if the Iranians threaten that if the other world powers will not answer to their demands in 60 days they might renew uranium enrichment to 20 percent.  If in 60 days this is what the Iranians are going to do, is the United States going to consider using a military option to stop the Iranians from enriching to 20 percent?

Mr. Hook:  There’s a lot of hypotheticals in there.  Maybe I’ll take the first one.  We don’t ever preview our sanctions, because if we were to preview our sanctions it would be giving a heads-up to the people that we’re intending to target.  I think it is well known that our campaign of maximum economic pressure is just getting started.  There is a lot more to come.  We’ve been saying that for some time.  Just in the last few weeks we’ve tightened the nuclear restrictions, we’ve imposed nuclear sanctions, we designated the IRGC and the Quds Force as a foreign terrorist organization, we announced no more oil waivers.  It’s going to continue, so I think you can expect that.

As Secretary Pompeo said, Iran can start behaving like a normal country or they can watch their economy crumble.  That’s the choice that sort of only they can make.

On the second question, I would just say it is too early to speculate.  Right now we have intentions.  We don’t have actions.  We are in close contact with our friends and allies.  We certainly take these sorts of threats seriously, but as I said earlier, we’re not ever going to be held hostage to the regime’s nuclear blackmail.  And we will look very closely at whether, if they follow through on their announcement, we will look very closely to see if this shortens the one-year nuclear breakout time line.  Beyond that, I’m not going to speculate.

Dr. Coates:  I would just emphasize that the phase that we’re going into now is a new phase of increased pressure.  One thing you can’t say about the President’s strategy here is that it’s in any way impulsive.  He came into office.  Took a year to examine the deal, to have our friends and allies make the case for why it should be retained.  He decided it did not merit that.  Then had a six-month wind-down period followed by six months of oil waivers.  So this process has been going on for some time, and what we initiated in November was the reimposition of our unilateral sanctions that had been relaxed, or waived under the JCPOA.

What we’re doing now is additional steps that haven’t been tried before.  So that’s what we mean by maximum pressure.  I think the President’s been very clear that when the security of the American people is imperiled, he retains the right to have all options on the table.

Question:  I understand your intention, you say, to get Iran to behave in lots of areas outside the JCPOA, what you call maligned activities, et cetera, as you’ve explained.  In the last year have you seen any indication at all that Iran is changing its behavior in these aspects?

Mr. Hook:  Yes we have.  In the New York Times in March there was an article by Ben Hubbard and the headline of that was “Sanctions curb support by Iran in allies’ fights”.  You have Shia fighters who are quoted, “The golden days are gone and will never return.”  This is an Iranian-backed militia in Syria.  He had lost a third of his salary and other benefits, and he said “Iran doesn’t have enough money to give us.”

And as the New York Times said, don’t take my word for it, “Across the Middle East Iran’s allies are showing signs of financial strain.”

This is a good thing.  The leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, in March made a public appeal for the first time in their history for donations.  And this is a consequence of the pressure that we are putting, we’re putting a lot of downward pressure on Iran’s revenues.

I’ll give you another example.  Iran reduced its military budget by 10 percent from 2017 to 2018.  Its 2019 and 2020 budget has a reduction of 28 percent in defense spending, including a 17 percent cut to the IRGC.  And we see Qassem Soleimani having a hard time funding his operations and they’re turning to oil smuggling.  And we have broken up some of those oil smuggling rings.  We’re going to continue to do that.

We have, working with other nations, have stripped Iranian oil tankers — 75 oil tankers to date don’t have a flag that they can sail under, and it’s very disruptive to lose your flag.

Overall, we have been denying the regime many billions of dollars in lost revenue, and that is money they would otherwise spend on Hezbollah, on Hamas, on Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen.  They just don’t have as much money as they used to.   And that is why we think that it is in the interest of the international community to join us in this pressure campaign, because it is making a difference.

Dr. Coates:  I would just add that you can tell a lot about a regime by where it chooses to allocate resources, especially as, as Brian was just detailing, the resources are becoming severely constricted.  I think certainly after the floods in which the Secretary of State offered to help which they’re not recovering from; they have a potential locust problem this summer which could be detrimental to their food supply.  There are a lot of places they could be investing resources and they’re not. 

But I do think, as Brian pointed out, the reduction in the defense budget and the restrictions of the supplies to their terrorist proxies is a good thing for the world.

Question:  Early this evening European banks and investors have been warned against engaging with the Special Purpose Vehicle to facilitate non-dollar trade with Iran.  Do you see a consistent European position on it?

Mr. Hook:  I’m not going to speak for the Europeans and speak for their position.  I can just make a couple of observations.

We don’t see any corporate demand for a Special Purpose Vehicle.  Our sanctions give European countries a choice, and it’s a choice they can freely make, and they know this.  They can either have access to the U.S. markets and the U.S. financial system, or they can do business with Iran.  That’s not a difficult decision given the relative size of the American market over Tehran’s market.

So we don’t see any corporate interest in an SPV.  We know that there is European interest in keeping the economic incentives going for Iran to stay in the deal, but we’re not in the deal anymore and so that is no longer a concern of ours.  We’re very much focused on the totality of threats that Iran presents.

We fully expect, I’m also not entirely confident that this vehicle will ever get off the ground because there has to be a mirror image set up on the Iranian side of this, and Iran doesn’t like to comply with FATF because they want, they have a financial sector that is deliberately dark.  They do not want people to be able to follow the money.  That’s why they don’t comply with FATF and that’s why they’ve been disconnected from the SWIFT financial messaging system, because they’re not in compliance.  They run a dark economy with the Revolutionary Guards controlling up to half of the economy.  It’s the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism.  

So I would question whether the regime ever decides that it wants to be that transparent and run an SPV.  So we don’t see much demand for it, and I don’t think the prospects of it for getting off the ground are that high.

Dr. Coates:  I concur.  I don’t think it’s necessary and I just wanted to emphasize Brian’s last point about the darkness of the Iranian economy.  There was all of one foreign direct investment in Iran in the first quarter of 2019.  It’s not a good place to do business.  And that is absolutely the fault of the regime, which is not allowing the Iranian people to develop the kind of economy that they should enjoy.

Mr. Hook:  I’ve also, I can’t remember the last time I checked it, if you look at total EU trade volumes, Iran isn’t even in the top 30.  The EU does more trade with Kazakhstan than it does with Iran.  It’s just not a significant market.  And European corporations would much rather do business with the United States than do business with Iran.  We’re easier to work with and the economic logic is plain to everyone.

The Trump administration said Monday that it will no longer exempt any countries from U.S. sanctions if they continue to buy Iranian oil, stepping up pressure on Iran in a move that primarily affects the five remaining major importers: China and India and U.S. treaty allies Japan, South Korea, Turkey.

President Donald Trump made the decision as part of the administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran that aims to eliminate all of its revenue from oil exports that the U.S. says funds destabilizing activity throughout the Middle East and beyond.

Two senior U.S. officials – Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook and Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Francis R. Fannon – refused to comment on whether any of them would be given additional time to complete purchases made prior to May 2 or allowed to use money already set aside for purchases after that date without penalty. Both said questions about such provisions were “hypothetical,” suggesting that some accommodation may be possible.

Fannon said the U.S. did not expect any sharp spike in oil prices or any significant reduction in the global supply of oil, given production increases by other countries, including the U.S. itself, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Brian Hook, Special Representative for Iran, and Francis R. Fannon, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Energy Resources Official.

Special Representative Hook:  Our goal has always been to get countries importing oil from Iran to zero as quickly as possible, and last November when we reimposed our sanctions we had a fairly tight oil market and at the President’s direction we granted a handful of oil waivers.  That was done because we weren’t looking to grant exceptions to our campaign of maximum economic pressure.  But we also didn’t want to put a lot of volatility in the oil market.

Now here we are in 2019 and all forecasts are supply exceeding demand.  We’ve also been working very closely with the Saudis and the Emiratis and other oil producers to ensure that as we take off the remaining one million barrels of Iranian crude being exported that those barrels are offset so that it ends up being a sort of net neutral.

We have imposed the toughest sanctions ever on the Iranian regime.  We’re going to continue to apply pressure on the regime until its leaders decide to start behaving more like a normal nation and less like a revolutionary cause.

We had made going after oil a priority because that historically has been the regime’s single largest source of revenue.  It uses funding from its oil exports to support terrorist proxies.  This is whether it’s Hezbollah in Lebanon, its own operations under the Quds Force in Syria, the Shia Militias that they fund and support in Iraq.  The same with the Houthis in Yemen.  So for everybody who is concerned about a more peaceful and stable Middle East, the best and surest path to do that is to deny the principle driver of instability the revenue that it needs to execute its foreign policy in the countries that I just mentioned.

We have been doing this all along in a way that meets our national security objectives but also maintains market stability.  Assistant Secretary Fannon is on the call who is also happy to answer any questions about the measures that we have taken to ensure that energy markets remain stable and well supplied.

We see a very good impact that our pressure is having in the region.  Even before yesterday’s announcement of zero, we have denied the regime direct access to more than $10 billion in revenue since May.  That works out to a loss of at least $30 million a day and that’s only with respect to the oil.  

When we deny the regime this revenue, it means less money to spend on missiles, on terrorism and on proxies like Hezbollah.

In March the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, publicly appealed for donations for the first time ever.  In the last several months he has been forced to undertake unprecedented austerity measures because money from Iran is not flowing in as it once did.  We have seen reports of Hezbollah fighters receiving half of their pay and Hezbollah is not alone in feeling the strain from a lack of funding from Iran.  Iranian proxies in Syria are also experiencing a lack of funding from Tehran and fighters are going unpaid.  That’s a good thing.  And the services that they once relied upon are drying up.  This means that our pressure is working and why we think it is important for other countries around the world to support this strategy of denying the regime revenue that it needs.

With that, I think Assistant Secretary Fannon and I are happy to take any questions.

Question:  The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, has criticized your decision to end sanction waivers for countries importing Iranian oil, and he elaborated on, he said that this will not serve regional peace and stability.  Turkey is a neighboring country to Iran and is depending on foreign energy.  How does your administration address or evaluate Turkey’s concerns? And another question regarding Turkey and Iran working on our special transactional channel in order to continue trade despite U.S. sanctions.  What is the U.S. response to such a move?

Special Representative Hook:  We continue to not see any corporate demand for a special purpose vehicle.  Any business that is given a choice between the American market and the Iranian market will almost completely, I can’t think of any, there are very few exceptions to this, anybody who would choose the Iranian  market over the American market.  And it also, for this mechanism to work, it requires Iran to comply with FATF standards.  Because you have the European vehicle but you need to have a mirror image on the Iranian side, and we have not seen any evidence that Iran wants to comply with FATF standards because their economy is designed to be opaque.  They do not want the press or other nations to be able to follow the money.

So there has been a lot of talk over many many months about a special purpose vehicle, and it has still not become operational partly for the reasons I mentioned and partly because we don’t see much corporate demand for it.

With regards to Turkey and your first question, it is hard to imagine a peaceful Middle East without a peaceful Iran.  And they are the last revolutionary regime on earth.  It is an expansionist foreign policy that is trying to create a Shia corridor of control, and it replaces national identities with sectarian identities and foments violence around the Middle East.  It also engages in proxy wars.  If we want to get serious about stopping this kind of regional aggression, we have to go after the oil revenue and other means of revenue that the regime uses to sustain its foreign policy.  So we just have a different assessment of what we think will contribute to regional peace and stability.

Iran likes to behave, they have this pattern of behavior where they essentially say to countries if you don’t allow us to behave like we want to behave, we’ll give you even more of the behavior you don’t like.  And we think that when people play by Iran’s rules, Iran usually wins.  And we need to change the paradigm.

The Iranian regime behaves very much like a religious mafia.  Some of the features of a mafia include threats, extortion and blackmail.  We think the world needs to understand these kinds of tactics and to oppose them so that they stop their regional aggression and destabilizing activities.

A/S Fannon: I think the point on the energy question with Turkey.  Two points.  First, the target of our sanctions policy is the Iranian regime, as Brian noted.  It’s not the importers.  And so what we’ve been doing through the course of our, over the last year plus, is to help countries find alternate sources of oil and in that case we’ve worked significant diplomatic overtures and helped on the technical side with Iraq to boost their output and are very pleased to see significant volumes of Iraqi oil now being imported into Turkey.  Those overtures will continue so that Turkey, as well as all of the importing countries, see and are able to obtain the oil that they need to continue to develop their economies.  Thank you.

Question:  China has described its cooperation with Iran as open, concerned and legal and that should be respected and has heavily criticized the U.S. for its step.  So what is your response to that characterization of China’s dealing with Iran?  And what will you do if China continues buying lots of oil from Iran?

Special Representative  Hook:  I don’t think we have to entertain hypotheticals, partly because they’re hypotheticals and they haven’t come to pass.  But partly because we have seen over 20 nations go to zero since May, and there hasn’t been any evidence that any of these countries are threatening or even thinking about evading or risking American sanctions.

What we have done is presented nations with a choice.  You can do business with the United States or you can import Iranian crude oil, but you can’t do both.  And when oil companies, oil exporters, look at the economics of that decision it’s not a hard decision to make.  It’s simply not.

So we don’t anticipate having — of course we will sanction any sanctionable activity, and we’ve already done that.  Since the time our sanctions were reimposed from the Iran Nuclear Deal in May, we have already sanctioned those who have tried to, who have tried to evade oil sanctions.  We will continue to do that.  But I think we should also just be mindful of the fact that we don’t think it’s in anyone’s interest for any nation to risk that because the cost/benefit is simply not there.

Question:  About the manipulation of the Iranian government.  What are you going to do?  Because it’s trying to manipulate the U.S. sanctions for the past few months.  And what are you going to do with the companies that have announced that it will continue dealing with Iranian exports and imports regarding to the oil?

Special Representative  Hook:  I think if I understand your question correctly, which is what will we do if people violate our sanctions, any companies.  If there are any individuals or entities who are engaging in sanctionable conduct, we will sanction it.  And that’s been our consistent policy ever since.

This administration has taken an entirely different approach to enforcement of sanctions that really doesn’t have much historical precedent with respect to Iran.  I think in prior administrations, there were a number of efforts to evade sanctions and I don’t think that those were enforced very strongly.

We have dedicated new resources within this administration to tracking efforts to evade sanctions and then imposing sanctions on those who try to violate it.  That work will continue.

Question:  Since yesterday’s announcement analysts are now looking at potentially $80 per barrel of oil by the third quarter when supply is forecast to be very tight.  And then you also have the oil market confronting the IMO 2020 rules at the end of this year.  Does the administration have the appetite for higher gasoline and diesel prices here in the U.S. come Labor Day?

Special Representative  Hook:  We’re speaking to, in the analysis that we’ve undertaken and the coordination with other producers around the world as well as the strong recognition of U.S. production continuing to increase.  Just last year an increase of 1.6 million barrels of added production.  EIA’s projecting a similar trend line this year.  And as a matter of course, EIA continues, it seems to underestimate performance.  They always have upward revisions.

We’re very pleased with the state of the market and we see the trend lines are extremely positive.  And having the commitments from other major producers is meaningful.  It is effectively reversing the voluntary curtailment that they had undertaken.

I mention all of that because your question was directed specifically to price and price at the pumps here in the United States, and those are not the focus areas of our foreign policy agenda.  The domestic price implication is a different question that we can’t speculate on here.  Thanks.

Question:  Will the U.S. depend on Saudi Arabia to fill the gap in the oil market?

Special Representative  Hook:  I just spoke a little bit about that point.  I think Saudi Arabia has made statements, it was referenced in the White House Statement, and of course Minister al-Falih made his own statement yesterday.  They are a partner in this.  They recognize that Iran creates unrest and is a threat to global stability in the Middle East in particular, and they are a partner with us in this effort.  And part of that is their commitment to increase both production of appropriate volumes but also the types of oil needed by respective importers.

We’re very pleased by that and we’re moving forward with our policy. 

Question:  I wanted to ask specifically about what Iran might do in response to these sanctions that you’re announcing.  Are you at all concerned that they might go back towards seeking a nuclear weapon?  And also are you concerned that Syria, which is being impacted by fuel shortages in part it seems related to hardships in Iran, might see state collapse at some point? 

Special Representative  Hook:   Iran on a fairly regular basis makes sort of extortionist threats and blackmail demands.  This is part of the regular course of their business.

I saw I think it was yesterday that they’ve threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.  They have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz more times than I can count.  The United States military will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.  That’s partly to ensure protection of the global commons so that it can be safe for commercial and non-commercial traffic.  

Iran is an outlaw regime and throughout their 40 years they generally try to hold countries hostage to blackmail, and they try to compel countries not to take actions they might for fear of Iranian reprisals.  And the international community needs to get its head around this sort of mafia style behavior, and we cannot allow ourselves to prevent ourselves from doing the right thing because of Iran’s threats to become even more dangerous than they otherwise would be.

So threats come out on a regular basis.  And it’s a purely hypothetical question you’re asking.  We track, of course, these things but the threats are nothing new.

Question:  My question is about what you expect about the impact of the sanctions Iranian oil in Syria?  And Bahrain was asking last week that we need more cooperation with the United States to assist them to, assist the countries in the region who can deal with Iranian terrorists in the future.  So I would love to hear your comments about two points ?

Special Representative  Hook:  We did sanction a couple of months ago, we did sanction an effort of oil smuggling to fund the IRGC Quds Force operations in Syria.  It was an effort by a combination of Russian and Syrian entities to try to sell Iranian oil on the black market so that they could help fund IRGC Quds Force operations, and I think also Lebanese Hezbollah.

We sanctioned that whole supply chain to try to deter.  This is part of sanctions enforcement which I talked about earlier, to try to deter sanctions evasion.  So that has been our principle focus at least on this side.  I can’t speak to — I mean our Syria envoy, Jim Jeffrey, has been very active there on the diplomatic side, working toward an irreversible political process that has as one of its features all forces under Iranian control leaving Syria.  That continues to be a priority for the United States.

Question: I just wanted to be clear on your response to the China criticism already mentioned. You’re saying you’re ready to impose sanctions on any Chinese companies that break your Iran sanctions.  Is that correct?

Special Representative  Hook:  I didn’t say that.  What I said was that it is the policy of this government to sanction any sanctionable behavior.  

Question:  Is that including from China?

Special Representative  Hook:  I didn’t say that.  You’re putting words in my mouth. What I said was that we’ll sanction any sanctionable behaviour.  

Because countries when they sit down and do the basic sort of economics of the decision, whether it’s better, whether it’s in their economic interest to continue to have access to the global financial system and to have access to the American markets, versus importing Iranian crude which is not exotic and is compatible with many other grades of crude oil that can be imported from other countries.  When they look at that decision point, it’s not a hard decision to make.  

I know the media likes to try to forecast what the next fight will be, but in this case we have not seen any countries who desire to import Iranian crude oil over having access to the global financial system.  

Question:  I would have one quick question, whether you have contact from the EU side and whether you received any reaction from Brussels yet regarding this step.  And also, regarding France because they said this morning that Iran and the progress.  What would be your reaction to this statement? 

Special Representative  Hook:  I think by Brussels you probably mean, I’m not sure if that means Frederica Mogherini or if it means the E3 or all 28 members of the EU.  I’m not sure which part of Brussels.

I think we lost her.  Anyway, I’ll take a stab at it.

I work with the E3 on a very regular basis to stay in touch with them.  I’m in communication with them every week.  The Secretary of State is in regular touch with his E3 counterparts.  We continue to agree on more than we disagree.  We obviously disagree about the Iran Nuclear Deal, but I think if you look at the record of European action since May of last year, it is a good record of trying to deter Iranian terrorism in Europe and they are also united in their opposition to Iran’s ballistic missile testing. I refer you to many letters from the E3 to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s ballistic missile testing and its space launch vehicles that they have been testing over the last few months.  The launches there.

So we will continue to work with the E3 as we have.  They are strong allies to the United States.  And they also understand that just because Iran is in compliance with the Iran Nuclear Deal, does not mean that this has somehow eliminated the non-nuclear threats that Iran presents to peace and security.

A/S Fannon:  I think that we are in a very strong position relative to the oil supply situation in terms of markets. I think you’re going to hear more of that, and I would encourage, I know [Fakhi Barral] with IEA, I think he’s speaking to this about the appropriate level of world balance.  I think we see a very strong forward trend, particularly about U.S. production.  I think this is an historic point.  We’ve been telegraphing going to zero for a year now to allow importers to make the necessary adjustment, and we’re assuring that there are sufficient volumes that no one’s going without.

• Equinor takes just 13 comments into account out of 30,000 submissions on its draft plan 
• Equinor lodges Environment Plan today to avoid government-regulated feedback process
• Over 10,000 protest across Australia in past month, from Western Australia to Queensland
• Two-thirds of Australians want Bight World Heritage listed; only 20% support oil drilling
• 17 southern Australian councils opposed or concerned, representing 600,000 people  

Norwegian Government-owned oil company Equinor has lodged its Environment Plan to drill for oil in the Great Australian Bight despite its promise it would “not push through resistance”. [i]

“Norwegian oil giant Equinor could not be more contemptuous of the Australian people,” said Wilderness Society South Australia Director Peter Owen. “Equinor lodged its Environment Plan on the last day it could to avoid a government-regulated public feedback process. Instead it ran its own sham feedback process and has dismissed almost all concerns in 30,000 unique submissions in just five weeks. Equinor admitted that just 13 comments led to any change in its Environment Plan. The Australian community has a right to be furious. Equinor has made it abundantly clear that it considers most of the Australian peoples’ legitimate concerns are irrelevant. 

“Among those concerns that Equinor considered irrelevant was people’s fundamental objections to oil and gas drilling in the Great Australian Bight. Is this really the position of this global company?

“This looks like a rush job, designed to push through the groundswell of growing community and political opposition to Equinor’s risky plans, not to mention getting the Environment Plan in to the regulator just a day before a government-regulated public comment process comes into effect.

“The community opposition to Equinor’s plans has escalated rapidly since it released its draft EP, with more than 10,000 people protesting on beaches right across Australia, supported by 28 surfing legends, including world champions Stephanie Gilmore and Mick Fanning. Over 30,000 people made submissions on Equinor’s Environmental Plan and 17 southern Australian local governments, representing more than 600,000 residents  have voted their concern or opposition to Bight oil drilling. Recent polling[ii]showed two-thirds of Australians want the Bight to be World Heritage listed and only one in five support drilling in the Bight. Just last weekend, while thousands protested in the surf mecca of Torquay, a Federal Government MP, Sarah Henderson, added her opposition to Equinor’s oil drilling plans for the Bight.[iii]

“The Fight for the Bight is now one of the biggest environmental protests Australia has ever seen and is gaining traction around the world. How much more reputational damage does the Norwegian Government-owned company want? Equinor will be deeply shocked if it thinks the protests will disappear if it gets an approval. Australia’s biggest environmental protests, over the Adani coal mine, the Franklin Dam, the James Price Point gas works and the Gunns pulp mill, have only escalated dramatically when approvals have been given.

“Equinor’s modelling shows that an oil spill from an ultra-deepwater well blowout in the Great Australian Bight could impact anywhere along southern Australia’s coast, from Esperance WA across to north of Sydney and even Tasmania.

“Ultra-deepwater drilling is a relatively new, high-risk operation carried out mostly off the coast of Brazil and in the Gulf of Mexico, where it caused the world’s biggest oil spill accident, BP’s Deepwater Horizon tragedy in 2010, when 800 million litres of oil spewed into the gulf for 87 days.”

“The Great Australian Bight waters are deeper, more treacherous and more remote than the Gulf of Mexico. There is no established offshore oil and gas industry in South Australia to deal with a disaster that could hit the Victorian coast. More than 6800 boats were involved in the Gulf clean-up but the South Australian Oyster Growers Association says that SA and neighbouring states probably have only 20 vessels that could operate safely in the waters where Equinor plans to drill.

“The Great Australian Bight is a unique, pristine wilderness marine environment, with 85 per cent of its marine species found only in these waters. It’s a haven for 36 species of whales and dolphins, including the world’s most important nursery for the endangered southern right whale.”

For further comment contact:

Wilderness Society South Australia Director Peter Owen on 0423 550 018

For more information, images & footage of the Bight & Gulf of Mexico visit http://bit.ly/23Cwu37

Or contact Wilderness Society media adviser Alex Tibbitts on 0416 420 168

#FightForTheBight

[i] https://www.portlincolntimes.com.au/story/5500024/we-like-the-bight-just-as-it-is-great/

Oystein Michelson, the vice president of development and production international, responsible for safety and security explained that social licence to operate was key to progressing the project. He said that if “we are not wanted here, we will not push through resistance”.

[ii] http://www.tai.org.au/content/national-poll-australians-opposed-drilling-great-australian-bight

[iii] https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/lib-mp-joins-protest-against-oil-drilling-in-great-australian-bight-defying-colleagues-20190422-p51g93.html