Iranian presence in Syria is empowering ISIS in the region, Washington’s special envoy to Syria told reporters on Wednesday.

In a telephone conference Ambassador James Jeffrey said the Trump administration will focus on pressuring Iran financially and contesting its activities in the region in a bid to push Tehran’s military and proxies out of Syria.

“We see that [ISIS and Iran] are closely linked,” said Mr Jeffrey. “ISIS to a large degree, certainly in Syria and Iraq, is based upon the populations – the Sunni Arab population,” he added, alluding to Iranian influence in the Syrian and Iraqi governments and its effect on their respective disgruntled Sunni populations.

“Iran’s encroachment into Arab areas gives no other alternative to pushing it out,” Mr Jeffery said.

In Syria, Tehran joined Moscow and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah in backing President Bashar Al Assad during the country’s seven-year war.

Mr Jeffery stressed that Washington’s strategy would not involve the direct military targeting of Iranian soldiers and proxy groups. Instead, he said, the new list of sanctions against vital oil exports, banking and transport industries would squeeze the country’s financial sector.

President Donald Trump in May pulled the US out of Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal to curb what he said were Tehran’s damaging activities in the region.

Washington, said Mr Jeffrey, would contest “more actively Iran’s activities particularly in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.”

The ambassador also linked the future withdrawal of American troops from Syria to the departure of Iranian forces from the country. Tehran enjoys influence in several countries in the region where it backs well-armed militias.

US policy is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, work on a solution to the conflict under the terms of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 and ensure all Iranian-commanded forces leave Syria entirely, he said.

Resolution 2254 is the main internationally-agreed upon document defining how to end the Syria war through a political transition.

“The US is pushing for the launch of a constitutional committee by end of December through the UN resolution of 2254 and to the regulation of a ceasefire,” Mr Jeffrey said.

But Mr Al Assad has resisted previous attempts to end the conflict through political settlements, and has held on to power for over seven years with help from Iran and Russia. Both have helped turn the tide decisively in favour of Mr Al Assad, especially during the last three years, with rebel forces being routed out in many areas.

Washington says that a continuation of Mr Al Assad’s regime will not lead to a political settlement.

US will only cooperate with a Syrian government that does not drive half of its population away, does not wage a criminal war on its people, does not use chemical weapons and does not threaten its neighbours or provides a base for Iranian power projection, he said.

“If they show us a Syrian government that could meet this criteria, then that would be a Syrian government that we can work with,” said Mr Jeffrey.

Below is a full rush transcript of the press conference by Ambassador James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement.

Ambassador Jeffrey: Thank you for tuning in, and the exchange that we’ll have on U.S.-Syria policy.

This policy is one of the key components of President Trump’s approach to the situation in the Near East. It’s very closely tied to our overall approach to Iran, but also to our approach to defeating terror throughout the region, but specifically with Syria.

The approach was developed over the past, at this point, nine or ten months but it really gained momentum when the President talked about Syria with President Putin in Helsinki and emphasized that the U.S. would be staying on in the long run in Syria to try to come up with a solution that meets the needs of the Syrian people, meets the needs of the region, and the international community in line with the relevant UN resolutions.

The policy, as summed up by the President in New York, thereafter at the UN, is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, to work on a solution to Syria under the terms of the 2015 UN Resolution 2254 that would involve, again this is a Trump quote, “de-escalating the military situation”, and revitalizing the political track for a constitutional committee and eventually elections in Syria to try to get to the underlying problems in Syria, that has led to half a million people dying, a huge flow of refugees throughout the region, and into Europe and the rise of Daesh.

Finally, as part of this, to ensure that all Iranian-commanded forces leave the entirety of Syria because we see the Iranians as part of the problem, not part of the solution.

So, our approach to this has been to strongly support the UN effort. We welcome the decision by the French, British, Turks and Russians at the Istanbul Summit now ten days ago, to call for a long-term ceasefire in Idlib, which is a key area in the conflict right now in the northwest of the country, and to launch the constitutional committee by the end of December.

Our focus is to try to encourage these two processes ultimately through a UN process, and it is actually all sketched out pretty well in 2254, to regularize the ceasefires, work on that to develop the political situation, and finally, have a situation where all foreign forces that have entered the conflict since 2011 will withdraw.

The Russians, having been there before, would not themselves withdraw, but you’ve got four other outside military forces — the Israeli, the Turkish, the Iranian and the American — all operating inside Syria right now. It’s a dangerous situation as we saw with the shoot-down of the IL-20 Russian aircraft by the Syrian military who thought they were shooting at the Israeli military who allegedly were shooting at Iranian military targets. So, that’s the kind of dangerous situation we have right now in Syria.

Our immediate effort is to try to calm that situation down and then work for a long-term solution.

Question: Deputy Secretary General of United Nations, Mr. Voronkov has said that over 20,000 terrorists from around 110 countries across the world are looking for ways to leave Syria and return to their countries of origin or go to other destinations which pose serious threat of the spreading of terrorism around the globe. Is the United States aware of these threats, and do you have any consultations or other actions to prevent it?

Ambassador Jeffrey: Yes, we do. Our focus is on defeating the last Daesh elements along the Euphrates, right across the border from Iraq, and that fight is going on right now with our partner, the Syrian Democratic Forces. But we’re also very aware of the presence of some al-Nusra, or they now call themselves Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and as well Daesh forces in Idlib and we’re in constant consultations, particularly with the Russian government and the Turkish government, about ways to deal with that.

We’re very concerned about these people, particularly the foreign fighters, leaving Syria and spreading out throughout the world. Good question.

Question: Massive divergences in the threat perception especially over the role of YPG remains between Ankara and Washington. After exchanges of fire in Northern Syria we saw U.S. and YPG joint patrols, and on one of the uniforms there was a small Öcalan picture. On the other hand, U.S. offers rewards for three senior members of PKK. Isn’t this a contradiction? Ambassador, can you please clarify how you explain offering rewards for three senior members of PKK while cooperating with YPG? Is YPG the armed wing of the PKK Syrian offshot or not?

Ambassador Jeffrey: Our position on the PKK is clear. We have not designated the YPG as a terrorist organization the way we have the PKK and we never did. We didn’t do that in the period before we entered into Syria either. We understand Turkey’s concerns about its security. We understand Turkey’s concerns about the links between the BYD and the PKK. Thus we’re being very very careful in several areas.

First of all, in informing Turkey on what we’re doing and why we’re in the Northeast. Secondly, in the area that Turkey has raised the most concern, in Manbij where Syrian Democratic Forces and thus PYD forces, went across the Euphrates to the west. We’re working on now joint patrols. We had been doing coordinated patrols. And we’re looking to execute the rest of what we call the road map for the withdrawal of the PYD from the Manbij area back across the Euphrates.

In terms of why we’re in the Northeast, we’re there for the enduring defeat of Daesh. This is an important objective. Turkey is a member of the coalition with us against Daesh. Daesh has done a great deal of damage to Turkey including the attack on the Istanbul Airport. We don’t want to see it do that again.

And again, we’re coordinating our overall policy very closely with Turkey. Turkey agrees with us on the need for a political solution. Turkey was a participant in the Istanbul Summit. We support those conclusions. Turkey is not happy with Iran’s presence in Syria. Turkey is not happy with the nature of the Syrian government. So there’s a great deal of commonality of view between us and Turkey.

Question: As Turkey wants YPG withdrawn from its borders, from Manbij, it seems that U.S. continues support for YPG. But recently you said that the U.S. resumed effort to solve the problems between the Turks and the YPG, but there [inaudible] escalating on the border, on Syrian-Turkish border. How do you plan to solve this problem? Do you really believe Turkey is open to reach a coalition with the YPG?

Ambassador Jeffrey: First of all, we are in constant communication with all sides.

Secondly, we are at pains to reassure Turkey that we will do everything we can. That there is no security threat coming, concrete security threat coming out of the north against Turkey, people raiding across the border and such.

Thirdly, we’re doing the Manbij program.

Fourthly, we are limiting, very, very carefully the weapons that we are giving the Syrian Democratic Forces because Turkey has concerns. We tell the Turks what weapons we give those people. We give them only light weapons. That’s one reason why they have not been as successful recently against Daesh as they have been in the past. They do not have tanks. They do not have artillery. We do not give them such heavy weapons.

Question: Iran has been in Syria for six years, and without its support and Russia for the Syria regime, to [inaudible] the early days. The question is why you left Iran to expand into Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon and now want to trim its nails and hold them accountable at this time? Thank you very much.

Ambassador Jeffrey: America has a broad set of alliance partners and friendly countries and security relationships throughout the region. They all feel threatened by Iran’s activities in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, other places as well from Afghanistan to Bahrain. And they turn to us to work with them to try to find a way to push back.

The last administration saw the solution in negotiating a nuclear deal with the Iranian regime. The nuclear deal was achieved. The problem is that that had no effect, or it actually had a bad effect on Iran’s behavior throughout the region. That is, Iran accelerated its activities.

Based upon that, the Trump administration is now focusing on, first of all, reversing the nuclear deal in order to put Iran under financial pressure; and secondly, contesting more actively Iran’s activities, particularly in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and that’s much of our policy right now in the Middle East.

Question: What is the blockage on appointment of the constitutional committee given that this was once seen as a Russian initiative?

Ambassador Jeffrey: He’s absolutely right. This was an initiative decided at the Sochi Agreement between the ISTANA3 — Turkey, Russia and Iran — and the UN in the form of the Syria Envoy Staffan de Mistura. The idea is that three groups representing the Syrian population would be set up. One, opposition supporters, which is already in place. There’s 50 names, they’ve been approved by everybody. Two, a government list that’s also in place. Three, a list appointed by de Mistura that would basically be a neutral list or a civil society list of people who are neither opposition nor government.

The problem is that the Syrian government has objected to de Mistura putting that list together without getting prior approval from Damascus, but that’s not what was agreed at the Sochi meeting, and therefore we were very heartened by President Putin accepting at the Istanbul Summit with Turkey, France and Germany, that in fact the constitutional committee could be launched before the end of the year which means that Staffan de Mistura can make any final decisions he wants on who is on that third list, but then he can go ahead and issue the invitations and stand up this constitutional committee.

Question: Was the only subject upon which there was genuine agreement between Russia and the United States. Did the situation change after the S-300 missile system had been sent to Syria?

Ambassador Jeffrey: We’re concerned very much about the S-300 system being deployed to Syria. The issue is at the detail level who will control it. What role will it play?

In the past Russia has been permissive in consultation with the Israelis about Israeli strikes against Iranian targets inside Syria. We certainly hope that that permissive approach will continue. But let me be clear. Israel has an existential interest in blocking Iran from deploying long-range power projection systems such as surface-to-surface missiles, air defense systems to protect them, and drones in Syria aimed at and used against Israel. We understand the existential interest and we support Israel.

Question: About the fight that’s taking place currently in Hajin. began on September 10, I believe, and so far they have not been able to make major advances. Why is it that slow? And do you believe that now with the arrival of the Special Forces of the SDF from other areas, this will speed up the operation? Thank you.

Ambassador Jeffrey: Thank you. I was recently in the northeast. I was down in Raqqa some distance from there, but I’m generally aware of the tactical situation.

What happened around Hajin is a tactical reverse. It’s nothing serious. The Daesh or ISIS forces there basically are still surrounded and reinforcements are coming in.

One other reason for the reverse there was unusually bad and sustained weather that limited our use of air power, which is very, very important in our fight against Daesh.

As the weather changes and as additional troops are introduced, I expect the situation will change and that we’ll see advances against Daesh. I’m confident of that.

Question: I was wondering if the U.S. is ready to accept president Bashar Al-Assad to stay in power during this transition? And if the answer is yes, do you have a deadline for him to stay in power or not?

Ambassador Jeffrey: First of all, there are a set of deadlines in UN Security Council Resolution 2254. We would hope that those deadlines could be met once the constitutional committee is set up and particularly once elections are organized.

In terms of the Assad regime, our policy is not focused on personalities per se, but on what the Syrian government does. We need a Syrian government that does not drive half its population away, which is what this one has done. Does not wage criminal war on its own population. Does not use chemical weapons. And does not threaten its neighbors. And does not provide a base for Iranian power project. And does not either create or cause to be created terrorist movements like Daesh.

If you show us a Syrian government that meets these criteria, then that would be a Syrian government that we could work with. So it’s not about personality.

Question: You mentioned the IL-20 and the S-300. Were you worried by Russia’s response to that incident? And have you told Russia that Israel would have U.S. backing in any future incidents of that kind in Syria?

For the recent bounties put on the heads of certain PKK members and what the significance is, if any, of the timing of that in terms of reassuring Turkey with regards to Northern Syria.

Ambassador Jeffrey: Sure. Let me take the second one first.

The U.S. understands that Turkey is facing a formidable foe in the PKK and that Turkey has every right to defend itself and we are supportive of Turkey in various says. One of the ways is these terrorist designations of individuals in line with our other actions including designating the entire PKK as a terrorist organization.

As I said, we understand and we talk to the Turks all the time about the Turks’ concerns about the YPG relationship with the PKK and we’re trying to be as careful as we can on that whole operation.

In terms of U.S. support for Israel, I think the best statement of that was at the Helsinki Summit in the press remarks made by the President. If you take a look at those, you’ll see very clearly that the U.S. supports Israel’s security needs.

Question: The Department of Defense’s Inspector General recently reported that ISIS has upped its recruitment activity. How concerning is the increase in ISIS activity? And is the fight going to go on longer than has been predicted or projected so far?

Ambassador Jeffrey: You’ve got the conventional fight against ISIS as an armed force of at one point 35,000 strong in Iraq and Syria. The last real battle of that campaign is being conducted now along the Euphrates as we discussed a moment ago.

However, as that Inspector General report and as other U.S. government and other members of the Coalition Against ISIS have said, ISIS is active in many different places, from Afghanistan to the Sinai to North Africa to Somalia. And we’re concerned about ISIS as an insurgent force, as a terrorist force. And also ISIS’ ability to infiltrate back into areas as a terrorist force, both in Iraq and in Syria in particular.

So that’s why we say that U.S. troops will stay on in Syria we say until the enduring defeat of ISIS which means to establish the conditions so that local forces, local populations, local governments, can deal with ISIS as a terrorist or as an insurgent movement, and we’re not there yet.

Question: At the beginning you mentioned that your mission is about getting rid of ISIS completely, but it looks like Iran is as important as that because in every other sentence you repeated Iran’s name and its influence in Syria.

Could you clear for us, what is your stand on Iran? And how much you’re happy to go to make sure Iran doesn’t have any presence in Syria? What is the end line?

Ambassador Jeffrey: Well, the end line is Iran not having, Iranian-commanded forces have departed the entirety of Syria. Obviously, that has to come in conjunction with various other developments. Eventually there should be a ceasefire in one or another way, overseen or executed by the UN, a new political regime for Syria which is what 2254 points towards. And in conjunction with that we see an Iranian withdrawal of forces as absolutely necessary to preserve the peace.

When I keep talking about Iran as a parallel objective to the defeat of ISIS, we see these in many respects as very closely linked.

ISIS, to a large degree, certainly its success in both Syria and Iraq, is based upon the populations, at least the Sunni Arab populations of much of Syria and Iraq seeing Iran’s encroachment into Arab areas and seeing no alternative to push back Iran than to throw support behind ISIS, unfortunately. So therefore Iran and ISIS are both linked.

Ambassador Jeffrey: Just that I want to underscore that Syria is right now in a fragile ceasefire country-wide, other than the fighting along the Euphrates against Daesh or ISIS. We want to see that ceasefire continue and become more formal and more reliable and sustained.

Secondly, we also realize that there are five outside military forces in close proximity in Syria, and that makes this conflict, even if right now it’s fairly quiet, potentially very dangerous. It’s very important that we make progress on a political solution.

Thank you very much.

The Trump administration says it will be relentless with its sanctions against Iran until it’s a “normal country,” but still giving major importers of Iranian oil a chance to continue business without penalties.

Iran has lost around $2 billion in oil revenue since May, when U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal, U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, told reporters on a call on Monday.

In a teleconference with journalists in the region, Brian H. Hook, US Special Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Adviser to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the Trump administration’s goal was zero imports of Iranian oil. “We have prepared for this day for the past six months. A million Iranian barrels of oil per day have been reduced from the market. More than 20 countries that previously imported oil from Iran have stopped” doing so, Hook said. “We will impose maximum economic pressure on Iran until it changes its behaviour.”

“We have taken 1 million barrels (of oil) off the market and that alone will reduce the Iranian regime’s oil revenues by $2 billion,” he said.

Brian Hook, Washington’s special representative for Iran, has underlined the risks for European companies, warning that any EU country hosting the so-called special purpose vehicle (SPV) could potentially be sanctioned.

“The United States will not hesitate to sanction any sanctionable activity in connection with our Iran sanctions regime,” Hook told a telephone call with European reporters when asked about the vehicle.

Hook said he did not see a demand from European companies to use the SPV because they preferred to invest in the United States.

“If you look at over 100 corporations that have decided to choose the United States market over the iranian market, they are not looking to avail themselves of any type of vehicle, they are very happy to continue working with the United States, “He told reporters.

The State Department’s director of policy planning and head of the Iran Action Group, Brian Hook, speaks about the “Iran Action Group” during a press briefing at the State department in Washington, DC, August 16, 2018. – Pompeo said the initiative is aimed at “directing, reviewing and coordinating all aspects of the State Department’s Iran-related activity.” (Photo by Andrew CABALLERO-REYNOLDS / AFP) (Photo credit should read ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP/Getty Images)

“In October, an Iranian assassin was arrested in Denmark for plotting an attack against members of a dissident group. And then you also had in June, security officials arrested an Iranian official for plotting to bomb a political rally in the heart of Paris.

Since the Iranian regime has come to power in 1979 it has conducted terrorist plots, assassinations and attacks in more than 20 countries and five continents around the world. And if you look at the report that I mentioned earlier, Outlaw Regime, on the State Department website, we list all of these assassinations and terrorist plots and attacks not only in Europe, but in all parts of the world.

So we have applauded European nations who have taken action against this threat. It is very strange to us to see this Iranian regime would spend so much time trying to keep the Europeans on-side, at the same time conducting bomb plots and assassination attempts in Europe. And it’s important for everybody to understand this is the regime that they’re dealing with, “He told to NORWAY NEWS.

Below is a full rush transcript of a press conference by Brian H. Hook, Special Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor at the Secretary of State.

Mr. Brian H. Hook : These are the toughest sanctions on the Iranian regime that have ever been imposed. Secretary Mnuchin said today it’s the largest-ever single-day action targeting the Iranian regime. And today the Treasury Department has sanctioned more than 700 individuals, entities, aircraft, and vessels.

This marks the reimposition of the remaining sanctions that were lifted or waived under the Iran nuclear deal.

The purpose of these sanctions is to diminish the regime’s capacity to fund its broad range of threats to peace and security. We want to place unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime so that it will ultimately come to the negotiating table and decide that the cost/benefit analysis of behaving like a violent revolutionary regime is no longer in their favour.

The second round of sanctions that have gone into effect focus on critical sectors of Iran’s economy such as its energy, shipping, banking and ship-building sectors. Also insurance services and transactions with Iran’s Central Bank.

I just want to also mention that over the last six months —since the time the President announced he was getting out of the deal- we have allowed corporations and other businesses to unwind their investments in Iran, and that also includes the energy sector. And over the last six months we have taken at least one million barrels of Iranian oil off the market. This is a loss of revenue of more than $2 billion. We have had more than 20 countries that imported Iranian oil prior to May, have now zeroed out their imports because of our sanctions. We’ve also had more than 100 major companies from around the world have withdrawn from Iran or canceled their planned investments. And this is tens of billions of dollars in lost investment.

These are the consequences of behaving like an outlaw regime. The State Department in September released a report titled “Outlaw Regime” that I encourage everybody to take a look at. The Secretary put it out on Twitter and it’s available on the State Department’s website, and it does a nice job of summarizing the range of Iran’s threats to peace and security, and this includes terrorism, terror finance, cyber attacks, maritime aggression, missile proliferation. The list is quite extensive.

Question: Turkey is amongst eight countries granted favor from U.S. oil sanctions on Iran. Could you give us some details on the terms and conditions? And Turkey violated the previous U.S. sanctions on Iran and until now has repeatedly said it will not comply with the U.S. sanctions. How do you plan to find a common ground?

Mr. Brian H. Hook : I last week met with the Deputy Foreign Minister from Turkey. I also had a very good conversation with him the week before. Our diplomats have had very good discussions with Turkey. We did decide to grant an SRE. As is the case with all SREs, we don’t talk about the terms of granting the SREs. We decided to issue a handful. Understand that two of the eight importers have already stopped importing, and there’s a third that will be at zero by the end of the year. So of the eight, there were three that needed a little bit of time to conclude. The biggest challenge we’ve had is ensuring that while we meet our national security objectives we do not at the same time increase the price of oil. That would be bad for the American economy, it would be bad for the global economy, and it would give Iran an advantage if the world were to see higher oil.

So we have taken a very thoughtful approach. We, as I said earlier we’ve already taken off two million barrels, from 2.7 to 1.6. There will be further reductions. We have done a good job during this period of taking off a million barrels of oil. We have at the same time ensured an adequately supplied and balanced oil market.

Iran has been engaging in fear mongering to try to increase the price of oil. I think the analysts who follow this understand that there are strong fundamentals in the oil market, and we have done a good job of balancing national security and economics.

Question: Do you see the EU’s Special Purpose Vehicle as an effort to undermine the U.S.’s maximum pressure campaign? And what message do you have to any European firm that’s thinking of trying to use the Special Purpose Vehicle to continue dealing with Iran?

Mr. Brian H. Hook : We have not seen much, if any, demand for the Special Purpose Vehicle. I think if you take a look at the over 100 corporations that have decided to choose the United States market over the Iranian market, they’re not looking to avail themselves of any type of vehicle. They are very pleased to continue working with the United States. It’s much easier to work with the United States. We have a transparent and open economy. We don’t have an economy that’s run by a revolutionary guard corps. And there’s no reputational risk working with the United States, unlike Iran where if you decide to invest in Iran you’re never quite sure whether you’re facilitating commerce or terrorism. There’s a great deal of reputational risk given that Iran takes the revenues from its dark economy and spends them in supporting Assad, supporting the Houthis, supporting Lebanese Hezbollah, supporting Hamas.

We have now visited over 30 countries, teams from the State Department and Treasury have visited over 30 countries around the world to educate nations on the dangers and the reputational risk of doing business in Iran. We think that message has been very well received. We have seen only support for our sanctions regime and we do not anticipate any significant corporation using a Special Purpose Vehicle.

Question: Last week reports surfaced a Norwegian man of Iranian origin who planned to carry out an assassination attempt in Denmark. This person was arrested last week. Can you comment on activities by Iran on European soil?

Mr. Brian H. Hook : That’s a great question. In October, an Iranian assassin was arrested in Denmark for plotting an attack against members of a dissident group. And then you also had in June, security officials arrested an Iranian official for plotting to bomb a political rally in the heart of Paris.

Since the Iranian regime has come to power in 1979 it has conducted terrorist plots, assassinations and attacks in more than 20 countries and five continents around the world. And if you look at the report that I mentioned earlier, Outlaw Regime, on the State Department website, we list all of these assassinations and terrorist plots and attacks not only in Europe, but in all parts of the world.

So we have applauded European nations who have taken action against this threat. It is very strange to us to see this Iranian regime would spend so much time trying to keep the Europeans on-side, at the same time conducting bomb plots and assassination attempts in Europe. And it’s important for everybody to understand this is the regime that they’re dealing with.

Question: can you explain on the humanitarian trade side, what actions is being taken either via Swift or via other notes from the U.S. authorities, what action is being taken to allow that trade to continue for non-U.S. companies? And secondly, can you confirm that the three civilian nuclear projects that are being exempted in addition to Bushehr, the work on retooling Arak, and Fordow will there be others.

Mr. Brian H. Hook : On the second question, we’ll be releasing a fact sheet on that shortly today.

On the first question, just as was done before, humanitarian transactions to non-designated entities will be allowed to use the Swift messaging system, just as they have done before.

The United States has always maintained broad authorizations that allow for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical devices by U.S. persons or from the United States to Iran, and then we also provide the same exemptions by non-U.S. persons, to non-designated persons in Iran. And we understand the importance of this humanitarian channel because it does help the Iranian people, and we have never targeted humanitarian trade as part of any sanctions regime.

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance in the world. It would make no sense for us to apply anything other than a robust policy of permission.

The biggest challenge we have is with Iran which historically has diverted humanitarian transactions away from the Iranian people. The Iranian people know through various press reports that they have a history of ensuring that the regime elites receive humanitarian assistance, access to medicines, etcetera. They do not make those available to the Iranian people. The longest-suffering victims of the Iranian regime are the Iranian people. So, they know, the Iranian people know that the regime when it was given over $100 billion in sanctions relief, $1.5 billion in cash, and they chose to spend that wealth on militias and on Bashir Al Assad and terrorism around the world rather than addressing the domestic needs of its own people.

So, we encourage these transactions to take place. Iran needs to create a financial sector that is open and transparent to facilitate those humanitarian sales which are permitted by our sanctions regime.

Question: Whether any countries have applied for waiver exemptions within Europe that were not granted them. I see for one, Spain has not been granted a waiver despite the fact they were importing more crude oil than Greece and Italy, who have been given for much of this time, and if there’s any color you could give around that decision.

And just secondly, very quickly, you reported on Friday that Russia has said it will continue trading oil with Iran. I just wondered whether you had any response to that under their so-called Oil for Goods program.

Mr. Brian H. Hook : The United States will not hesitate to sanction any sanctionable activity in connection with our Iran sanctions regime. That’s the answer to the second question.

On the first one, we’ve had 20 countries, as I said, that have already zeroed out their imports. We have only had to grant a handful of waivers for the reasons I’ve talked about earlier, but we’re very satisfied with the architecture that we have set up. So I can’t say much beyond that.

We have, of the eight, there are only five that are significant. The other three are already at zero, and they’re just finishing up a payment, or they’ll be done by the end of the year.

So most countries, the majority of the countries that import Iranian crude have gone to zero, and our policy, our goal remains getting countries to zero over time, and we’re not looking to grant exemptions or waivers. I talked about the reasons why we did it this time. So we’ll be, over the next six months the significant reduction exceptions are granted for a period of six months, and then when we get to May, we’ll be reassessing where we are with our diplomacy. We’re hopeful that we’ll have a more robustly supplied oil market. Right now it’s adequately supplied. We’ve seen more supply coming on in 2019, which of course puts us in a better position to accelerate our path to zero.

Question: This unprecedented sanction and pressure against Iran did you see any window that you missed for the Iranian authorities to reengage on the regional and with the international community on the matters of concern whether it is nuclear or ballistic activity?

Mr. Brian H. Hook : The President and the Secretary of State have made clear that we are open to negotiations with Iran. The Ayatollah has said publicly that the Iranian regime requires hostility with the United States. They have said on a number of different occasions that they are not, Iran is not seeking talks with us. But we have made it clear, Secretary Pompeo made it clear in May when he listed the 12 requirements that Iran must meet. These 12 requirements reflected the global consensus prior to the adoption of the Iran Nuclear Deal. We’re simply asking the Islamic Republic to behave like a normal country so that it can enjoy the privileges of a normal country. Normal countries don’t terrorize other nations, proliferate missiles and rob their own people blind. This is a dark religious dictatorship that has been imposing enormous suffering for 39 years on the Iranian people. Many of the demands that the Iranian people make are the same demands that we are making.

We would like Iran to get out of Syria. So would the Iranian people. You saw that in the protests in December and January where people were holding up signs saying, “Forget Syria, Remember Us.”

So we think that we have been very clear about the best path going forward. If Iran is willing to start behaving like a normal country and we can get to a new agreement that addresses the entire range of threats that Iran presents to peace and security, then it’s a very positive future for the Iranian people. Full diplomatic relations with the United States, commercial relations. We would welcome Iran into the international financial community.

The problem is that because the regime has behaved like a revolutionary regime for 39 years, the regime, the country has gone through economic and diplomatic isolation for much of its history. That certainly isn’t for the benefit of the Iranian people. They pay an enormous price for the revolutionary behavior of this regime.

So we hope and are confident in our diplomacy, deployment of maximum pressure other than to deny than revenues to fund terrorism and violent misadventures around the world, is to get them to come back to the negotiating table. Historically, that has worked. In the run-up to the Iran Nuclear Deal in the last administration you had a great deal of economic pressure that was put on Iran, and they eventually came to the table. We anticipate the same outcome under the current sanctions regime.

Question: What risks are there for energy markets in EU countries of the results of the sanctions against Iran?

Mr. Brian H. Hook : We don’t see any risk to the energy market because we have, the United States has increased its crude oil production. We’re up by 1.7 million barrels per day. Our exports are up one million barrels. Over the next year U.S. production will increase by one million barrels per day or more. The Saudis have increased production, Iraq, Russia, they’ve all increased production. So we see in 2018, we anticipate that supply will exceed demand, and I think the price at Brent in May is about the same price it is now, which shows that we have been able to take off a million barrels of Iranian crude without increasing the price of oil.

We will ensure, as we continue to take more barrels of Iranian crude off the market that those are replaced with alternative crude supplies to keep the oil market stable and well supplied.

Question: Earlier you described the Special Purpose Vehicle basically as an empty hole. Those weren’t your words, but you described it as something that isn’t gaining a lot of traction on the market.

However, it does seem to be held up as sort of a shiny object in Tehran by those people who argue in favor of upholding the terms of the JCPOA.

So my question to you is, is it actually in the U.S. interest to, are you actually encouraging the Europeans to keep up their work, that way to give the Iranians a reason to not start engaging in nuclear activity? Or put differently, what would you like the Europeans to do differently than they are doing now?

Mr. Brian H. Hook : Whether the Europeans and the other parties to the deal provide or don’t provide economic benefits to the regime under the JCPOA is irrelevant to the broader question of whether Iran should restart its nuclear program. That would be an enormous mistake. If Iran were to do that, then that would presumably end the nuclear deal.

We’ve made our decision to get out of the deal. Other nations need to make their own decisions in their sovereign capacity. We are very much focused on the future, not the past. We are focused on getting a new and better deal, one that does not just address one threat that Iran presents to peace and security, but the range of threats that Iran presents. We think that was one of the mistakes of the Iran deal, was that it was narrow. It was too narrow. And then it gave a green light to Iran to engage in all of the non-nuclear threats to peace and security which Iran has done for the life of its regime.

Going back to your question about the Special Purpose Vehicle, doing business with the regime just gives it revenues. You’re just giving revenues to the number one state sponsor of terrorism in the world. And when you look at the costs of doing business, we see it illustrated by the terrorist activities inside of Europe: in Paris and in Denmark. So we think that it is in Europe’s best interest to take the range of threats that Iran presents with more focus. We know that we share the same threat assessment. We think it’s important for the members of the European Union to take action against Iran’s missile program, which has been proliferating around the Middle East, in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon. We’re very pleased to see more than 100 companies that have decided to end doing business with Iran. We think that number will grow. And we will continue to take all the actions that we think are necessary to improve the security of the American people and to put enough pressure on the regime so that it decides to change its behavior.

Question: I wanted to know if the European country hosting the SPV would be talked to by U.S. sanctions? So the headquartering country of SPV, would it be vulnerable to U.S. sanctions? Thank you.

Mr. Brian H. Hook : If an individual or entity engages in a transaction that is in violation of our sanctions regime then, as we’ve said repeatedly, we will sanction sanctionable activity.

We do not anticipate much need for this because we have already seen such enormous support for our way forward. If you are a major European company or if you’re a major company anywhere in the world, you will choose, if you’re given a choice between doing business in the United States and doing business with Iran, it will be the fastest decision you ever make as CEO. So we just don’t anticipate people availing themselves of any kind of vehicle to evade our sanctions regime.

Brian Hook is the U.S. Special Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State. Prior to this appointment, he served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff from 2017-2018.

From 2009-2017, he managed an international strategic consulting firm based in Washington, DC. He held a number of senior positions in the Bush Administration, including Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations; Senior Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations;

Special Assistant to the President for Policy in the White House Chief of Staff’s office; and Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, at the Justice Department.

He practiced corporate law at Hogan & Hartson in Washington from 1999-2003. Before practicing law, he served as an advisor to Iowa Governor Terry Branstad and to U.S. Congressman James Leach.